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ABSTRACT 
 
     In this study, I extended the stochastic model built by Babcock and Paulson (2012) to 
conduct a one-year cost projection for crop insurance in order to investigate its feasibility of 
being solely provided by private firms. Based on the 52 years’ yield data from 1961 to 2012, 
the risk consequences from insuring crop yield and revenue against losses are estimated to be 
far beyond what private insurers could bear on their own. However, reinsurance from the 
government provides an attractive incentive to insurance firms. Among the six insurance 
policies researched in this study, the minimum expected net underwriting gains to private 
firms with government reinsurance in 2013 was $289.9 million, which is about 9.30% of 
retained premiums. The maximum loss that firms could have borne in 2013 was $4.9 billion. 
In addition, the impact of a proposal to eliminate premium subsidy for the harvest price 
option is also estimated. The total savings for taxpayers are estimated to be $1.3 billion, 
which is about $400 million more than CBO’s estimate in 2013, but only 67% of its estimate 
in 2015. 
 Based on the three-crop competitive storage model initiated by Lence and Hayes 
(2002), I also develop a better approach for a multiple-year cost projection by modeling the 
demand shock as a random walk. This approach is capable of preserving the correlations 
between national yields and prices, maintaining the relationships among national, county and 
farm yields, retaining the spatial correlations of yields across crops, and incorporating 
inter-temporal price correlations as well. More importantly, this approach is capable of 
simulating price draws with a desired volatility pattern: increasing over time but at a slower 
rate than square root of time 𝑡𝑡, as stated in Lence, Hart and Hayes (2009). Preserving these 
correlations and price-related features are crucial in conducting precise cost estimations and 
valid policy analysis. My analysis shows that the payments from Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
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with its time-invariant fixed guarantees would be significantly underestimated if both the 
price serial correlation and the increasing, concave price volatilities are ignored. For 
Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), their 
guarantees are adjusted to reflect market conditions so the difference in estimated payments is 
modest. An easy fix for estimating the cost of PLC is to inflate the price volatilities used to 
generate random prices for budget scoring purposes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
     For policy makers, assessing the taxpayers’ monetary cost of an agricultural program is 
an important stage preceding its implementation. In particular, policymakers would like to 
estimate this cost not only for a single year but also for the entire horizon of implementation. 
By comparing those costs associated with various alternatives against the cost of the existing 
program that is subject to replacement, they can examine whether the new programs, once 
implemented, can help to reduce taxpayers’ spending without undermining the objectives of 
the programs, which are designed primarily to benefit farmers (Sumner, Smith and Goodwin, 
2011).   
     The 2014 Farm Bill eliminates direct payments, the countercyclical payment program 
and the Average Crop Revenue Election program. These programs are replaced with two new 
programs called Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC). 
Producers were required to make an irreversible decision between the two, with PLC set as 
the default option. In brief, ARC is a revenue insurance program which covers so-called 
“shallow losses” and has both county-based and individual-based coverage options. For 
farmers who sign up for ARC-county, the indemnities are triggered if the actual county 
revenue falls below 86% of county expected revenue. The expected revnue in a county is 
defined as the product of the Olympic average1 of county yields and the Olympic average of 
national market year average (MYA) prices in last five years. In contrast, PLC is a price 
insurance program like the counter-cyclical payment program it replaced, but with much 
higher price guarantees. Payments are made when a commodity’s MYA price falls below its 
statutorily fixed reference price. In addition, for farmers who sign up for PLC, they also have 
                                                              
1 The Olympic average is to take the average after droping off the maximum and minimum values. 
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the option to buy yield or revenue insurance that supplements their federal crop insurance. 
The supplemental insurance is called Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), which is a 
county-based insurance policy with 65% premium subsidy. A detailed introduction of these 
three programs are contained in Chapter 4. The purpose of this research is to develop 
improved methods to estimate taxpayers’ costs of these three programs and the costs of crop 
insurance. Costs are estimated from an ex ante (to 2014) perspective.  
     Cost estimation of agricultural programs has long been of interest to agricultural 
economists. Babcock and Paulson (2012) developed an extensive nationwide model that takes 
yield and price variability into account to estimate annual payments over 2013-2017 for all 
the potential new commodity programs. Their results indicated that the proposed farm bill 
would distort farmers’ planting decisions if the payments from the new programs were based 
on actual planted acreage. Moreover, they found that the impact on the aggregate planted 
acreage and that on the composition of it is quite different from each other: while the bill has 
little effect on the former, it could significantly affect the acreage allocated to various crops. 
Intuitively, the acreage would shift towards the crops that have relative larger returns under 
the proposed farm bill. As a result, the farmers planting the underlying crops in developing 
countries would receive lower prices than they would otherwise. Babcock and Paulson’s 
arguments on acreage allocations were consistent with the findings published by Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in June 2015. In FAPRI’s report, the actual 
amount of base acres reallocated to corn, rice and peanut were about 10.39 million acres, 0.69 
million acres and 0.53 million acres more than its March 2015 baseline due to the relatively 
larger projected per-acre payments for these three crops than for most other crops. However, 
Congress decided to not couple payments to planted acreage, so these programs will not 
likely have much impact on farmers decisions. Their main impact will be on taxpayers’ costs. 
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     Paulson, Woodard and Babcock (2013) adopted the same stochastic model as Babcock 
and Paulson (2012) to estimate the distribution of payments from the proposed programs in 
the House and Senate Farm Bills based on the historical county yield data from National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), base crop insurance rates from Risk Management 
Agency (RMA), and the March 2012 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline 
projections on commodity prices and price volatilities. Their results showed that the expected 
payment per acre varied significantly across programs, crops and regions, and the Senate’s 
bill was generally preferred over the House’s bill from the perspective of corn and soybeans 
producers, particularly those in the Midwest. 
     In their stochastic model, price draws were simulated independently from a lognormal 
distribution with a mean set equal to the corresponding CBO projected price level for each 
year of 2013-2017. The price volatility was assumed to be the level used for rating 2012 crop 
revenue insurance policies and stay unchanged over the entire farm bill period, which is 
exactly in line with what CBO does when scoring new programs. However, their assumption 
regarding a constant price volatility over time is at odds with the empirical evidence. Lence, 
Hart and Hayes (2009) found that the volatility of commodity prices tends to increase over 
time but at a decreasing rate due to mean reversion. 
     Furthermore, strong serial correlation observed in historical commodity prices is 
assumed away when prices are simulated independently across different years. Figure 1 
depicts the time series of corn, soybeans and wheat price received by U.S. farmers from 1950 
to 2014. These series exhibit obvious time trends and significant variations in the amplitude 
of fluctuations across time, most notably the peak in 2012. Moreover, commodity prices in 
one year are positively correlated with those in the next. Deviations from quadratic time 
trends to each of the three price series exhibit strong serial correlation at 0.73 for corn, 0.76 
for soybeans and 0.72 for wheat.  
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     The fact that CBO does not account for either increasing price volatility or serial 
correlation raises the question about how accounting for these two market realities will 
influence cost projections when CBO makes a multiple-year projection of program costs. 
Thus one objective of this research is to explore the impacts on cost projections after 
accounting for the increasing price volatilities over time and the serial correlation. Because 
the main crops affected by the farm bill are storable, a three-crop storage model is employed 
in this study to simulate price draws with desired properties. These prices are then used to 
estimate the costs for ARC, PLC and SCO over 2014-2018.  
     The stochastic model built by Babcock and Paulson (2012) provides an appropriate 
framework for one-year cost projections. Their model successfully maintains the spatial 
correlations of yields across different crops and various counties by using Iman and 
Conover’s resorting method along with empirical yield distributions. To begin my analysis I 
follow their basic framework and conduct a one-year (2013) cost analysis to examine the 
taxpayers’ cost of crop insurance programs and to determine the feasibility of private delivery 
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of the program. Specifically, my analysis involves two steps. First I estimate the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of underwriting losses taken by private insurers who provide 
insurance for corn, cotton, soybeans, spring wheat and winter wheat. Second the distribution 
of underwriting losses is re-estimated, assuming reinsurance from government is available. 
As expected, the risk resulted from crop insurance cannot be insured solely by private firms. 
Reinsurance from government makes it much more attractive to private companies. 
     I also use the model to estimate taxpayers’ cost savings from a proposed reform of the 
crop insurance program. The reform, proposed by Senators Flake and Shaheen, would 
eliminate premium subsidy for the so-called harvest price option. I estimate the savings by 
calculating the difference in taxpayers’ costs between the programs with the harvest price 
option and those without, at various coverage levels. My results indicate that the reform 
would reduce taxpayers’ costs by about $1.33 billion in 2013, which is about $400 million 
more than CBO’s estimate in 2013 but $600 million less than its estimate in 2015. All results 
from analyzing the crop insurance apply to a single year, 2013. Although it seems 
straightforward to extend the analysis to multiple years, simply repeating this procedure in a 
dynamic world may bias our calculations, due to failing to take into account the serial 
correlation and the fact that price volatilities increase over time. 
 To estimate costs over a five-year time horizon I employ a three-crop competitive 
storage model to simulate inter-temporally correlated price draws. The storage model 
explicitly explains how commodity prices interact with production and storage and, as shown 
by the existing literature, can be a tool to generate highly auto-correlated prices. However, 
there are two challenges in this modeling strategy: solving the model and calibrating it to 
meet price-related targets given the current market environment. In particular, the model is 
calibrated to meet three market-based targets: (1) the base year (2014) price volatility from 
the model matches the historical price volatility; (2) the amount of serial correlation in 
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simulated prices is calibrated to what has been observed in historical price data;  and (3) 
price volatility increases over time but at a rate slower than square root of time 𝑡𝑡, as 
confirmed by Lence, Hart and Hayes (2009). The two instruments I use to calibrate the model 
are the standard deviation of a random walk demand shock and the elasticity of demand for 
the commodity crops. With only two instruments and three targets, I cannot calibrate the 
model exactly to meet all three targets. I chose to make sure that 2014 price volatilities are set 
at historical levels and also make sure that price volatilities are an increasing and concave 
function of time within the five year projection period. The amount of serial correlation in the 
simulated prices is close to historical levels. 
 Upon the completion of the simulation from the storage model, I applied a model 
similar to Babcock and Paulson’s stochastic model, to score ARC, PLC and SCO for each 
year of a five-year projection period, with their model as a benchmark. The results are 
compared against those from the storage model to study whether the introduction of serial 
correlations and increasing, concave price volatilities result in any difference in cost 
estimations. The comparison demonstrates that program payments for PLC will be 
significantly underestimated if both of the two facts are ignored, but the program payments 
for SCO and ARC are not. Furthermore, I isolated the impacts of serial dependence alone 
upon cost estimations and the analysis indicates that most of the variations in program 
payouts can be attributed to the increasing and concave price volatilities. 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives details about 
how Babcock and Paulson’s stochastic model can be applied to quantify the risk from crop 
insurance to both taxpayers and private insurers in 2013. Chapter 3 presents the competitive 
storage model and how it is solved and applied to simulate price draws. The new programs 
that I evaluate are documented in Chapter 4. The estimated payments for each program over 
2014-2018 are shown in that chapter as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
QUANTIFYING RISK FROM DELIVERING CROP INSURANCE 
 
Policy Background 
     In this chapter I develop a model of crop insurance to estimate the aggregate amount of 
risk facing crop insurance companies and the positive impacts of reinsurance from 
government. The impact of a proposal to eliminate premium subsidy for the harvest revenue 
option is also investigated.  
     Compared to the reinsurance simulator built by Vedenov et al. (2004), the model in this 
study has a much finer calibration of farm-level yields. The farm-level yields are created by 
shocking the county-level yields rather than the crop reporting district-level yields as they did, 
so they implicitly assumed all the counties under the same crop district share an exactly same 
farm-level yield distribution. Moreover, they did not have a scheme to maintain the spatial 
correlations among crop yields, which is one key factor that differentiates crop insurance 
from conventional ones2. 
     Here, I focus on five crops: corn, upland cotton, soybeans, spring wheat and winter 
wheat. Together they accounted for 71% of total insured acres in 2013. In total, six crop 
insurance products are examined: Area Yield Protection (AYP), Yield Protection (YP), Area 
Revenue Protection (ARP), Area Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion 
(ARP-HPE), Revenue Protection (RP) and Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion 
(RP-HPE). The first two are yield-based insurance products which set a guarantee for yield, 
and the last four are revenue-based insurance which provide insurance against losses in 
revenue.  
 
                                                              
2 As stated in Miranda and Glauber (1997), that is, auto collision, workers compensation, homeowners multiple peril, 
commercial multiple peril, inland marine, fire, group accident and health, allied lines, ocean marine and crop-hail insurance 
policies 
8 
 
Area Yield Protection (AYP) 
     The policy pays indemnities when county i’s realized yields (y𝑖𝑖) fall below α percent 
of the expected county yield (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖), thus it is possible that farmers who suffered crop losses will 
not be indemnified if there is no indication of similar loss in the yield at the relevant county 
level. In particular, per acre indemnities are calculated as 
 I = max(0,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − y𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼⁄ ) ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝜋𝜋 (1) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 is the projected price, yield coverage α can be chosen from 70% to 90% in 5% 
increments. Scale 𝜋𝜋 can be selected from 80% to 120% by farmers, with which farmers can 
better match the county yield insurance indemnities with their individual expected losses. 
Yield Protection (YP) 
     Farmers receive indemnity payment when their yield (y) falls below α percent of the 
average of their individual production history (Y), which is defined as the average of 
county-level yields in most recent five years in this analysis and therefore a same yield 
guarantee is shared among farmers . Per acre indemnities are defined as: 
 I = max(0,αY − y) ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 (2) 
Farmers can select α, the amount of average yield he or she wishes to insure, from 50% to 
85%. 
ARP and ARP-HPE 
     Payments are made to a farmer if the realized average county revenue is less than the 
revenue guarantee chosen by the farmer. The revenue guarantee for ARP-HPE is equal to the 
product of the coverage level α selected by the farmer, the expected county yield and the 
projected price. The ARP policy uses a similar revenue guarantee, except that its price 
component can be updated to the realized harvest price if the realized price is higher than its 
projected level. Specifically, per acre indemnities of ARP-HPE can be stated as: 
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 I = max[0,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 − y𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑃𝑃ℎ 𝛼𝛼⁄ ] ∗ 𝜋𝜋 (3) 
Similarly, per acre indemnities of ARP can be written as: 
 I = max�0,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ∗ max�𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,  𝑃𝑃ℎ� − y𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑃𝑃ℎ 𝛼𝛼⁄ � ∗ 𝜋𝜋 (4) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 and 𝑃𝑃ℎ are measures of projected and harvest prices. Price 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 (𝑃𝑃ℎ) is the average 
daily settlement prices in the month prior to planting (harvesting) for the harvest futures 
contract. For example, the projected (harvest) price for corn is the average daily settlement 
prices in February (October) for the December corn futures contract. And farmers can choose 
yield coverage α from 70% to 90% and scale 𝜋𝜋 from 80% to 120%. 
RP and RP-HPE 
     Payments are made to farmers if his or her realized revenue is less than the revenue 
guarantee. And per acre indemnities of RP are calculated as follows: 
 I = max[0,αY ∗ max (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,  𝑃𝑃ℎ) − y ∗  𝑃𝑃ℎ] (5) 
Similarly, the per acre indemnities of RP-HPE are given by: 
 I = max[0,αY ∗  𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 − y ∗  𝑃𝑃ℎ] (6) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 and 𝑃𝑃ℎ  are of the same definitions as that under county coverage. And the 
coverage level α can be selected from 50% to 85%. 
 
Data and Simulation Model 
     Historical county-level and national-level yield data from 1961-2012 were collected for 
these five crops from NASS. Counties included in this analysis are those with at least 20 
years’ yield histories over the time period from 1990 to 2012. Furthermore, I treat counties 
with yield for both irrigated and non-irrigated practice separately, which involves estimating 
the payments for each practice type in that county, and then calculating the acreage-weighted 
payments by using the reported acres on these two practices for that county. 
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     The price component of per-acre indemnities for revenue-based policies is determined 
by two price levels: projected price (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) and harvest price (𝑃𝑃ℎ) as shown in equations (3)-(6). 
Both of these prices are set based on commodity futures markets to calculate the actual 
indemnities. Table 1 below lists the commodity exchange price information used to set those 
levels for each of the five crops investigated in this study. For example, the projected (harvest) 
price of corn is the average daily settlement price of its December futures contract in 
February (October). Moreover, in order to project the 2013 total indemnities for each of the 
four revenue-based policies, the harvest prices are assumed to be log-normally distributed 
with the mean set to their respective projected levels ?⃗?𝜇, and volatility ?⃗?𝜎 set to the levels used 
for the rating of 2013 crop revenue insurance policies, where 𝜇𝜇 = ($5.65/𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, $12.87/𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,$0.81/𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏, $8.44/𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, $8.78/𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏) , and ?⃗?𝜎 = (20%, 17%, 17%, 15%, 24%)  for corn, 
soybeans, cotton, spring wheat and winter wheat, respectively. In addition, the projected 
prices and harvest prices for the period of 2000-2012 are collected from RMA to measure the 
historical price-yield correlations among the five crops, which will be imposed on the 
simulated harvest prices. 
Table 1. Commodity exchange price provisions (CEPP) 2012 and succeeding crop years 
      
Projected price 
discovery period 
Harvest price discovery 
period 
Contract 
commodity 
Commodity 
exchange 
Contract 
Month 
Starting 
date 
Ending 
date 
Starting 
date 
Ending 
date 
Corn CBOT December Feb-1 Feb-28 Oct-1 Oct-31 
Cotton ICE December Feb-1 Feb-28 Oct-1 Oct-31 
Soybeans CBOT November Feb-1 Feb-28 Oct-1 Oct-31 
Spring Wheat MGE September Feb-1 Feb-28 Aug-1 Aug-31 
Winter Wheat KCBT July Aug-15 Sep-14 Jun-1 Jun-30 
Note: Risk Management Agency provides CEPP on a state basis, so for each crop I only list the discovery periods for the state 
that has most production for that crop in 2012. Specifically, the CEPP is for corn of Iowa, cotton of Texas, soybeans of Illinois, 
spring wheat of North Dakota and winter wheat of Kansas. 
 
Simulating harvest prices 
     Before the national-level and county-level yield histories can be employed, they have 
to be adjusted for positive trends, thus a simple OLS regression is implemented: 
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 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = β0 + β1𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑈𝑈 (7) 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = exp�β�0 + β�1𝑡𝑡� (8) 
 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = α𝑦𝑦�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (9) 
 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = α�𝑦𝑦�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (10) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the trended national-level yield at time t. 
     Equation (11) below gives the specific formula to calculate the historical correlations 
between prices and national-level yields. Yield deviate is defined as the percentage change of 
yield from its trend, and price deviate is calculated as the percentage change in prices from 
the projected to the harvest. And I further assume the correlation structure among the most 
recent time period would reflect the current and future price-yield relationships more 
precisely, so that is why only twelve most recent years of data are used to estimate 
correlation. 
 
𝜌𝜌�𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 113∑  𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑈𝑈 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈   𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈=2012𝑈𝑈=2000
�
113∑  [𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑈𝑈 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈  ]2𝑈𝑈=2012𝑈𝑈=2000 � 113∑  [𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  ]2𝑈𝑈=2012𝑈𝑈=2000
 (11) 
The estimates for own price-yield correlation coefficients are -0.59, -0.24, -0.42, -0.29 and 
-0.31 for corn, cotton, soybeans, spring wheat and winter wheat, respectively. Note that all of 
them are negative, which is consistent with the fact that U.S. is a large country with respect to 
the international trade of these crops. 
     Following Babcock and Paulson (2012), the empirical yield distribution is generated by 
vertically stacking the national-level yield deviates from 1961-2012 500 times to create a 
yield sample with 26,000 observations (Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Ker and Coble, 2003; 
Vedenov et al., 2004). In contrast to the parametric distribution of yield, the empirical 
distribution naturally captures the historical spatial correlations of yields across crops and 
counties, which may not be fully reflected in the parametric specifications. Moreover, it 
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avoids the potential misspecification that the marginal distribution of yield is parametrically 
Beta or Weibull. 
  As for the simulation of prices, I start the process by simulating 26,000*5 independent 
draws from a standard uniform distribution. Then I employ the resorting method introduced 
in Iman and Conover (1982) to impose the historical correlations upon the simulated prices. 
Their method is straightforward and relatively easy to implement. The only operation on the 
data is resorting. This method is based on rank correlations, because, as Iman and Conover 
pointed out, the Pearson correlation coefficients can be misleading if the underlying data is 
not normal or it contains outliers. Below is the specific procedure: 
1) Create a matrix 𝐶𝐶 with the desired rank correlation coefficients, which can be achieved 
by the following sub steps. 
a. Denote the historical rank correlation matrix as 𝑇𝑇. Since it is positive-definite, there 
exists a unique upper triangular matrix 𝑃𝑃 such that 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑃𝑃’ ∗ 𝑃𝑃 (where 𝑃𝑃’ is the 
transpose of 𝑃𝑃 and can be obtained by Cholesky factorization). 
b. Let 𝐴𝐴 be a 26000*10 matrix with all of its elements drawn from a standard normal 
distribution. Its correlation coefficient matrix is denoted as 𝐷𝐷 and decomposed 
to 𝑄𝑄’ ∗ 𝑄𝑄. 
c. Let 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑄𝑄−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑃, and 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑆. The transformed matrix 𝐶𝐶  should have a rank 
correlation matrix close to the target 𝑇𝑇. 
2) Combine 26000*5 uniform-distributed draws with the 26000*5 empirical yield deviates 
into a 26000*10 matrix  𝐽𝐽. Rearrange elements in each column of 𝐽𝐽 to match the order of 
the elements in the corresponding column of the matrix 𝐶𝐶 so that  𝐽𝐽 will have the same 
rank correlation matrix as 𝐶𝐶, which is close to the target 𝑇𝑇. However, yield deviates are 
left unsorted so as to preserve the spatial correlations of the empirical yield distributions. 
The resorted 26000*5 draws from uniform distributions are then transformed into five 
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lognormal distributions with a different target of mean and volatility. As a result, for each 
crop, this stacking will generate 500 harvest price realizations for each specific year of 
the 52-year histories. 
     The target and simulated sample rank correlations are listed in Tables 2 and 3. The first 
5x5 elements in the target rank correlation matrix are replaced with the actual rank 
correlations of the 26000*5 U.S. yield deviates in order to maintain the year-to-year yield 
correlations across crops. The Iman and Conover approach does a good job in matching the 
target rank correlation matrix, with the maximum difference between the target and simulated 
sample rank correlations being merely 0.023. 
 
Calibrating the farm-level yield variability 
     Following Vedenov et al. (2004), all county-level yield histories (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈) are detrended to 
2013-equivalent yields (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈).  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2013𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  , t = 1961, … ,2012 (12) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2013𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the trended yield of county i in 2013. 
     For individual-based policies, I simulate 100 farm-level yields for each county and year 
over 1961-2012, which is achieved by adding 100 normal deviates to county-level yields. The 
normal deviates are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and some pre-specified 
value of standard deviation, which is assumed to be accurately calibrated by RMA base crop 
insurance rates for 2013 crop year reported in RMA’s Actuarial Data Master. Specifically, an 
implied premium rate for 65% coverage of YP from the simulated farm-level yields across all 
available years with county yield realizations match exactly the 2013 RMA 65% base rate in 
the county for YP. 
                                                              
3 Since I need to freeze the yield deviates, the maximum difference between the target and simulated rank correlation 
matrix is 0.04 instead of 0.02. 
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     For revenue-based insurance policies, the 52-year detrended county-level yields are 
vertically stacked 500 times in order to maintain the spatial correlation across crops and 
counties. The spatial correlations among county yields have large effects on the cumulative 
distribution function of private insurance companies’ underwriting losses. If there is no 
spatial correlation among crops, that is, county yields are independent from each other, then 
the county yield risks can be pooled and eliminated by a well-diversified portfolio. On the 
other hand, if the county yields are perfectly correlated, the county yield risks can be hedged 
via futures and options markets. Furthermore, every row (year) of yield realization is matched 
with the corresponding row of harvest price draws so as to keep the historical correlations 
between national-level yields and prices. Preserving the price-yield correlations is crucial in 
conducting a valid revenue-based program analysis. 
     All the policies in this analysis are defined to cover losses from 70% to 85% of 
expected yield or revenue. In each scenario, I consider only one available policy, say RP, and 
all the contracts are assumed to be insured under the same coverage level. As a result, I will 
get 26,000 simulated indemnities per acre for each crop/county and calculate the 26,000 
indemnities in dollars using the 2012 county-level harvested acre data. Summing them up 
across different crops and counties will yield the total indemnities in dollars across crops and 
counties. Finally, the distributions for loss ratios and for underwriting losses can be computed, 
where the loss ratio and the underwriting losses are defined as Loss Ratio4 =  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼
, 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙 = 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 −  𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼4F5. The yield-based policies are much simpler to 
simulate because their indemnities do not rely on the harvest prices. Thus there are 52 
simulated indemnities per acre for each county and crop. Similarly, the total indemnities in 
dollars across counties and crops for a given coverage level can be calculated. 
                                                              
4 Premium is calculated as the expected indemnities, that is equal to setting expected net income from insurance is zero 
for private companies. 
 
5 Underwriting Gain=Premium-Indemnity. 
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6 swheat and wwheat stand for spring wheat and winter wheat, respectively. 
Table 2. Rank correlation matrix for U.S. yield deviates and price deviates over 2000-2012   
 corn yield soybean yield cotton yield swheat yield wwheat yield corn price soybean price cotton price swheat price wwheat price 
corn yield 1 0.58 0.16 0.54 0.30 -0.62 -0.40 0.00 -0.59 -0.24 
soybean yield 1 0.32 0.26 0.07 -0.23 -0.27 -0.04 -0.07 0.10 
cotton yield   1 0.15 -0.20 -0.21 -0.03 -0.38 0.14 0.36 
swheat6 yield    1 0.31 -0.15 0.03 0.15 -0.26 -0.48 
wwheat yield    1 -0.42 -0.19 -0.13 -0.48 -0.29 
corn price      1 0.64 0.48 0.70 -0.12 
soybean price      1 0.66 0.82 -0.46 
cotton price        1 0.44 -0.42 
swheat price         1 -0.02 
wwheat price         1 
Table 3. Rank correlation matrix for U.S. yield deviates and simulated price draws over 1961-2012  
 corn yield soybean yield cotton yield swheat yield wwheat yield corn price soybean price cotton price swheat price wwheat price 
corn yield 1 0.58 0.16 0.54 0.30 -0.59 -0.36 0.00 -0.59 -0.26 
soybean yield 1 0.32 0.26 0.07 -0.25 -0.28 -0.05 -0.10 0.08 
cotton yield   1 0.15 -0.20 -0.20 -0.02 -0.35 0.15 0.36 
swheat yield    1 0.31 -0.14 0.05 0.14 -0.25 -0.46 
wwheat yield    1 -0.40 -0.16 -0.14 -0.48 -0.28 
corn price      1 0.61 0.47 0.67 -0.11 
soybean price      1 0.65 0.80 -0.44 
cotton price        1 0.42 -0.41 
swheat price         1 0.01 
wwheat price         1 
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Assigning the policies to reinsurance funds 
     After simulating the distribution of indemnities, I also estimate how much protection 
private insurers would receive from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) through 
the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). The SRA is a cooperative financial assistance 
agreement between FCIC and private companies to subsidize the delivery and reinsurance of 
crop insurance to eligible crops. Specifically, insurance companies may place eligible 
contracts they sell and serve with high expected loss ratios in the Assigned Risk Fund (ARF) 
while retaining contracts with relatively low risk in the Commercial Fund (CF). The 
non-proportional shares of losses and gains are outlined in Table 4. The shares of losses taken 
by FCIC and companies vary by loss ratio, reinsurance fund and State group. As companies’ 
loss ratios go up, FCIC will assume a larger amount of shares in losses. In the extreme case, 
FCIC assumes 100% of losses if the loss ratio exceeds 500% in a state. In the case of 
underwriting gains, FCIC takes more gains as loss ratio decreases. 
     Following Mason, Hayes and Lence (2003), I use the 2012 state-level premium 
allocations between ARF and CF which are available from RMA7 to mimic the 2013 
state-level allocations, and then assign the contracts from each county to ARF based on the 
risk they present to private insurers. The procedure is as follows. First, for each state, I 
calculate the dollar amounts of premiums that are allocated to ARF by assuming the 
proportion of premiums assigned to ARF is same as that in 2012 for that state. Second, I rank 
counties’ contracts for a particular state by the standard deviations of their loss ratios. I assign 
policies to ARF from counties   with the largest standard deviation until the total premium 
reaches the state’s share of premiums that are allocated to ARF for 2013. The process is 
repeated for every remaining state. How I allocated policies to reinsurance funds differs from 
how private insurers allocate policies. Private companies typically will designate all contracts   
                                                              
7 http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/reins_public/ 
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Table 4. Companies' shares in underwriting losses and gains under SRA 
 
Losses Gains 
State Group State group 18 State group 29 and 310 State group 1 State group 2 and 3 
Reinsurance Fund 
 
Loss ratio between 100% and 160% Loss ratio between 65% and 100% 
Commercial Fund 65.0% 42.5% 75.0% 97.5% 
Assigned Risk Fund 7.5% 7.5% 22.5% 22.5% 
 
Loss ratio between 160% and 220% Loss ratio between 50% and 65% 
Commercial Fund 45.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 
Assigned Risk Fund 6.0% 6.0% 13.5% 13.5% 
 
Loss ratio between 220% and 500% Loss ratios less than 50% 
Commercial Fund 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
Assigned Risk Fund 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 
Note: FCIC will assume 100% of that portion of the underwriting loss amount for which the company's loss ratio exceed 500% of total retained premium in a given state and fund for given 
reinsurance year. 
                                                              
8 State group 1 means Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska. 
 
9 State group 2 means Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 
10 State group 3 means Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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from a county to CF if they are able to estimate the distribution of its loss ratio, and allocate 
the contracts to ARF if they do not have enough related information or they know it would be 
quite risky to retain those contracts based on their operating experience. Thus I am likely to 
underestimate the amount of underwriting losses that the private industry cedes to the 
government in the ARF. In addition, my approach may overestimate aggregate underwriting 
losses for private companies because of the possible benefits of retaining counties with high 
variance if they have a lack of correlation in losses with other counties. It is not practical for 
me to try to more closely mimic how private companies allocate their policies because I 
assume that premiums for all policies are set at actuarially fair levels. 
     After the county-level allocation is completed, I apply the terms of the SRA to 
calculate the amount of underwriting losses retained by insurance companies, and sum them 
across counties, which results in 26,000 (52) simulated total underwriting losses for 
revenue-based policies (yield-based policies). 
 
Eliminating premium subsidies for harvest price option 
     One proposed reform of crop insurance programs is to remove harvest price option 
(HPO) on revenue-based policies. The rationale for this proposal is that many believe that 
HPO over-compensates farmers for losses because liability is increased if the harvest price is 
higher than the insured planting price. According to the Harvest Price Subsidy Prohibition 
Act introduced by Senate Jeff Flake and Senate Jeanne Shaheen on February 12, 2015, the 
elimination of HPO would save taxpayers $19 billion over the next 10 years. Note that was 
not the first time that reform of this type has been discussed. In 2013 Senate Flake offered the 
same proposal as an amendment to the farm bill. At that time, CBO projected that the 
amendment would have saved taxpayers $9 billion over 10 years. Thus it will be interesting 
to estimate the amount of savings using the extended stochastic model built in this study. 
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Results and Discussions 
     Table 5 below displays the statistics of underwriting losses under four coverage levels 
for six insurance policies before applying the SRA. The expected underwriting loss is zero 
for all the cases, as the premium is always set to be equal to the expected indemnities.  
Table 5. Statistics of the underwriting losses by policy and coverage level 
  Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85% 
YP 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2482.9 3001.8 3577.3 4196.9 
Minimum -2490.8 -3037.2 -3669.0 -4380.3 
Maximum 8962.8 10752.0 12669.0 14655.0 
AYP 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2015.3 2648.7 3377.7 4187.1 
Minimum -1431.0 -1905.7 -2511.3 -3253.3 
Maximum 8367.1 11051.0 13887.7 16729.9 
RP 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2764.3 3463.0 4261.3 5138.1 
Minimum -3419.3 -4469.7 -5764.8 -7315.2 
Maximum 18951.0 22432.7 25826.7 29019.7 
RP-HPE 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2353.9 3012.7 3797.3 4700.2 
Minimum -3421.8 -4510.0 -5887.8 -7590.1 
Maximum 19313.3 22956.3 26556.3 30005.0 
ARP-HPE 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2441.1 3254.1 4230.6 5345.3 
Minimum -1931.9 -2824.5 -4043.9 -5622.4 
Maximum 28117.3 32560.1 36366.0 39424.2 
ARP 
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 2895.8 3787.5 4816.6 5941.2 
Minimum -2485.6 -3477.0 -4858.7 -6681.9 
Maximum 27840.6 32121.3 35703.9 38483.6 
Note: Results of YP and AYP are based on 52 underwriting losses observations while results of RP, RP-HPE, ARP-HPE and 
ARP are based on 26000 simulated underwriting losses. All values are expressed in millions of dollars. 
     If all the crops are insured under YP at the 85% coverage levels, the insurance 
companies would face a maximum of underwriting losses of $14.655 billion and obtain a 
maximum underwriting gain of $4.38 billion. As the coverage level decreases, the maximum 
underwriting losses (gains) decrease, as does the standard deviation. Moreover, these 
20 
 
variables follow the same pattern under all other policies. And among all the policies, the 
standard deviation of underwriting losses are largest for ARP under each of the four coverage 
levels. In other words, the private companies bear most risk if all the crops are insured under 
ARP. The reason for this is that the amount of diversification is higher under farm-level 
insurance because of the distribution of farm yields around the county average yield in each.   
Table 6. Coefficients of variation of total indemnities by policy and coverage level 
Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85% 
No SRA:         
YP 45.99% 44.86% 43.37% 41.51% 
AYP 131.55% 125.43% 117.84% 109.00% 
ARP 111.86% 101.73% 91.45% 81.41% 
ARP-HPE 126.07% 114.61% 103.60% 93.31% 
RP-HPE 50.14% 49.92% 49.25% 48.16% 
RP 48.76% 47.37% 45.53% 43.30% 
Apply SRA:      
YP 15.29% 15.61% 15.92% 16.08% 
AYP 17.57% 19.39% 21.16% 22.20% 
ARP 18.03% 19.88% 21.49% 22.54% 
ARP-HPE 17.48% 19.81% 22.05% 23.85% 
RP-HPE 15.49% 16.61% 17.79% 18.75% 
RP 15.54% 16.30% 17.01% 17.55% 
 
     I also calculate the coefficients of variation11 of total indemnities under different 
coverage levels for each policy. They are listed in Table 6 above. If all crops are insured with 
70% coverage and without reinsurance from government, the coefficients of variation of total 
indemnities paid by private crop insurers range from 46.0% to 131.6%. According to Miranda 
and Glauber (1997), the variations of total indemnities paid by conventional insurers12 range 
from 5.3% to 14.9%. Thus the risk from insuring crop yields and revenues are far beyond the 
level that private crop insurers can solely bear. However, with the reinsurance from 
government, the coefficients of variation of total indemnities are significantly lower, ranging 
                                                              
11 Coefficients of variation = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈⁄  
 
12 As stated in Miranda and Glauber (1997), that is, auto collision, workers compensation, homeowners multiple peril, 
commercial multiple peril, inland marine, fire, group accident and health, allied lines, ocean marine and crop-hail insurance 
policies. 
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from 15.3% for YP at the 65% coverage level to 23.85% for ARP-HPE at the 85% coverage 
level. Lowering the coefficient of variation of indemnities to these levels is what incentivizes 
private companies to get involved in the crop insurance business.  
     Figure 2 below shows the cumulative distribution function of the underwriting losses 
under different coverage levels if all crops are insured under yield protection and without 
reinsurance from government. As coverage level increases, the CDF of the underwriting 
losses rotates clockwise, which means the risk level goes up as coverage level increases. This 
is a quite intuitive result because the frequency of indemnities increases and so too does their 
magnitude. This conclusion also holds true when crops are insured under the other five 
policies. I only list the corresponding estimated CDF of the underwriting losses for RP in 
Figure 3, because all revenue-based policies have similar charts as that of RP while the CDF 
of the underwriting losses for AYP is close to that of YP. The CDF of the underwriting losses 
for RP shares the same pattern with that for YP, but the curve is much smoother because of  
the additional simulations required to capture the price variation for the revenue-based 
policies. 
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     Figure 4 above presents the CDFs of loss ratios under different coverage levels if all 
crops are insured under yield protection or revenue protection. The distribution of loss ratios 
does not change much as coverage level changes. The maximum and minimum of loss ratios 
with 70% coverage under YP are 2.66 and 0.54, respectively, while those under RP are 4.34 
and 0.40, respectively. Together Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicate that while the coverage level 
affects both the absolute value of loss and its expected value, the effects tend to be in a 
similar proportion, which shifts the distribution of their difference, but leaves that of their 
ratio almost unchanged. 
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Table 7. Statistics of loss ratios of corn vs. of all crops by policy and coverage level if 
no SRA 
 
  Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85%  
YP 
Corn only:          
Standard Deviation 0.6837  0.6624  0.6354  0.6031   
Minimum 0.42  0.43  0.43  0.44   
Maximum 3.35  3.25  3.13  2.99   
All crops:          
Standard Deviation 0.4599  0.4486  0.4337  0.4151   
Minimum 0.54  0.55  0.56  0.57   
Maximum 2.66  2.61  2.54  2.45   
RP 
Corn only:          
Standard Deviation 0.7725  0.7373  0.6962  0.6508   
Minimum 0.25  0.24  0.24  0.25   
Maximum 6.22  5.61  4.99  4.43   
All crops:          
Standard Deviation 0.4876  0.4737  0.4553  0.4330   
Minimum 0.40  0.39  0.38  0.38   
Maximum 4.34  4.07  3.76  3.45   
Note: Results of YP (RP) are based on 52 (26000) underwriting losses observations. The expected loss ratio is equal to 1 
by construction.  
 
     
     Table 7 above lists the respective summary statistics of loss ratios from insuring only 
corn and insuring all crops under YP or RP if reinsurance is not available. The results for 
other policies are not displayed since they exhibit similar patterns. The corresponding CDFs 
of loss ratios with 85% coverage are depicted in Figure 5. Compared to the case of providing 
insurance to all the five crops, insuring only corn yield or revenue gives a much larger 
standard deviation and larger maximum loss ratios under each coverage level. Therefore, 
private insurers derive some benefit from diversifying across crops. However, diversification 
across crops is clearly limited because other crop yields and prices are correlated with corn 
yields and prices, together with the fact that corn represents a large portion of total planted 
acreage.13 
                                                              
13 In 2013, the US total acreage planted for corn, cotton, soybeans, spring wheat and winter wheat are 95.34 million acres, 
10.34 million acres, 76.49 million acres, 11.60 million acres and 43.09 million acres, respectively. 
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     The statistics of underwriting losses paid by insurance firms are summarized in Table 8. 
Compared to the “No SRA” scenario, reinsurance from the government does a very good job 
in reducing the risk faced by private companies from offering crop yield and revenue 
insurance. Instead of being actuarially fair, the SRA creates an expected underwriting gain to 
insurance companies of up to $673.5 million per year. This is in addition to the amount these 
companies receive to cover the costs of servicing crop insurance policies. Moreover, the SRA 
decreases the standard deviations of insurers’ underwriting losses by more than 70 percent 
under every coverage level. The reduced risk is also reflected in smaller range of the 
underwriting losses. The maximum observed underwriting loss of ARP-HPE is $39.4 billion 
before reinsurance and only $2.8 billion after reinsurance. Reinsurance also improves 
VAR(95%)14 and VAR(90%). There is 5 percent probability that private firms would lose at 
                                                              
14 VAR(95%) is the vaule V such that prob(underwriting losses ≤ V) = 95%. 
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least $11.9 billion under ARP if no reinsurance available. However, the amount reduces to 
$1.6 billion after applying the SRA. 
Table 8. Summary statistics of companies' underwriting losses before and after applying 
SRA15  
Policy YP AYP RP RP-HPE ARP-HPE ARP 
No SRA:           
Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Standard Deviation 4196.9  4187.1  5138.1  4700.2  5345.3  5941.2  
Minimum -4380.3  -3253.3  -7315.2  -7590.1  -5622.4  -6681.9  
Maximum 14655.0  16729.9  29019.7  30005.0  39424.2  38483.6  
VAR(95%) 9444.1  8798.3  10419.6  9073.7  11011.9  11924.5  
VAR(90%) 6727.0  7437.7  7725.7  6131.5  6744.9  8674.2  
Apply SRA:             
Mean -629.8  -521.5  -673.5  -552.9  -554.2  -640.0  
Standard Deviation 1121.0  531.1  1454.9  1272.1  904.9  1110.6  
Minimum -2014.1  -1014.4  -2849.6  -2537.2  -1641.0  -1996.5  
Maximum 2347.3  1036.9  4873.2  3981.4  2775.6  3579.7  
VAR(95%) 1667.3  656.3  2209.1  2004.3  1469.9  1610.6  
VAR(90%) 1036.1  378.5  1563.4  1361.0  855.5  1007.3  
Note: Results of YP and AYP are based on 52 underwriting losses observations while results of other policies are based on 
26000 simulated underwriting losses. All values are expressed in millions of dollars. And it is under 85% coverage level. 
      
     Figure 6 below compares the CDFs of the underwriting losses paid by private 
companies before and after government reinsurance given all the contracts are insured with 
85% coverage level of YP. The blue solid line is the CDF of the underwriting losses without 
applying SRA. The red dotted line stands for the CDF after applying SRA. Without 
involvement of the government, the probability of obtaining underwriting gains from insuring 
crop yields is about 67 percent, that is, losses occur at 33 percent of time for private insurance 
companies. However, if the private insurers get reinsurance from government through SRA, 
not only the chance of suffering a loss will decrease, but also the risk (in terms of standard 
deviations) will decline. Also notice that the expected underwriting gain increases to $629.8 
million, which is about 7.75% of retained premiums. 
                                                              
15 Under the reinsurance scenario, I take into account the net book quota share, which is to cede 6.5% of companies’ 
cumulative underwriting gain or loss to FCIC. 
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     The corresponding comparison for RP is listed in Figure 7. Without reinsurance from 
the government, the private firms would suffer a loss about 38 percent of time, which is 
higher than the situation where all the crops are insured under yield protection. However, 
with reinsurance from government, not only the chance of suffering a loss declines to 29%, 
but also the risk would be eliminated to a great extent, from $5.1 billion to $1.5 billion 
(shown in Table 8). And the expected underwriting gain has increased to $673.5 million, 
which accounts for 7.02% of retained premiums. 
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  Summary statistics of program costs paid by taxpayers are contained in Table 9. For 
each policy, as coverage level goes up, all the variables (mean, standard deviation etc.) 
increase. ARP turns out to be the riskiest policy for taxpayers as well. If all crops are insured 
under ARP, taxpayers are expected to pay at least $416.8 million. Under 85% coverage, the 
maximum underwriting losses (gains) is $35.2 ($4.7) billion. And there is a 5 percent chance 
that taxpayers would pay at least $10.6 billion. 
  The corresponding CDFs of the underwriting losses that taxpayers incur from crop 
yield or revenue insurance are shown in Figure 8. The distribution rotates clockwise as 
coverage level increases, which indicates taxpayers are exposed to higher level of risk with 
the increase in coverage. 
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Table 9. Statistics of underwriting costs paid by taxpayers by policy and 
coverage level 
  Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85% 
YP 
Mean 395.4  468.8  545.4  629.8  
Standard Deviation 1959.5  2328.5  2717.2  3112.3  
Minimum -1421.4  -1726.6  -2076.5  -2453.7  
Maximum 7939.1  9387.8  10858.5  12307.7  
VAR(95%) 4243.8  5143.9  6145.7  7197.4  
VAR(90%) 3619.7  4299.3  4981.5  5690.9  
AYP 
Mean 289.9  366.0  441.1  521.5  
Standard Deviation 1870.9  2422.6  3031.9  3681.7  
Minimum -1011.8  -1331.6  -1750.1  -2253.0  
Maximum 8154.5  10649.1  13203.1  15693.1  
VAR(95%) 4424.2  5263.0  6425.0  8105.4  
VAR(90%) 2817.8  3974.7  5513.7  7063.8  
RP 
Mean 432.1  513.7  593.6  673.5  
Standard Deviation 2218.1  2704.5  3222.4  3741.4  
Minimum -2113.3  -2759.0  -3549.4  -4465.7  
Maximum 17174.9  19993.9  22529.8  24658.2  
VAR(95%) 5013.6  6068.0  7215.0  8328.8  
VAR(90%) 3690.3  4488.4  5336.7  6209.3  
RP-HPE 
Mean 351.4  419.6  489.6  552.9  
Standard Deviation 1915.7  2388.9  2915.8  3487.7  
Minimum -2283.8  -3014.2  -3932.7  -5074.2  
Maximum 17857.3  20953.6  23835.2  26394.9  
VAR(95%) 3860.1  4822.3  5954.4  7152.8  
VAR(90%) 2515.4  3175.9  3964.3  4812.3  
ARP-HPE 
Mean 328.0  413.3  496.5  554.2  
Standard Deviation 2263.0  2942.4  3699.2  4492.2  
Minimum -1380.2  -2017.1  -2873.0  -3981.5  
Maximum 27410.3  31433.4  34631.9  36864.7  
VAR(95%) 4169.2  5744.8  7587.2  9569.0  
VAR(90%) 2292.8  3262.3  4510.7  5914.7  
ARP 
Mean 416.8  511.3  589.8  640.0  
Standard Deviation 2638.6  3359.5  4125.6  4883.4  
Minimum -1764.7  -2454.7  -3424.0  -4704.0  
Maximum 26876.3  30615.8  33457.6  35234.3  
VAR(95%) 5988.6  7491.1  9061.6  10579.2  
VAR(90%) 3891.4  5133.7  6400.4  7669.1  
Note: Results of YP and AYP are based on 52 underwriting losses observations while results of RP, RP-HPE, 
ARP-HPE and ARP are based on 26000 simulated underwriting losses. All values are expressed in millions of 
dollars. 
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Evaluation of proposal to eliminate subsidies for harvest price option   
 Eliminating subsidies on harvest option policies can save taxpayers in three aspects. 
First, it can reduce the amount of underwriting loss sharing. If we assume that all farmers 
switch to RP without harvest option due to the removal of subsidies on RP, it would be 
reasonable to calculate the differences in the amount of underwriting gains and losses paid by 
taxpayers between RP and RP-HPE. The calculated difference would be the estimated 
savings for taxpayers due to changes in the amount of underwriting gains that private 
companies obtain. Table 10 displays the per acre cost comparison between RP and RP-HPE. 
If all the contracts are insured under RP with 85% coverage level, taxpayers are expected to 
pay $3.40 for each acre insured, which is about 60 cents more than the case where only 
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RP-HPE is available for farmers. On average, the saving is about 40 cents to 60 cents. 
However, when losses are very high, say at its 90% quantile, this difference can be as large as 
$6.50 per acre. The dollar amount of annual savings would range from $74 million to $110 
million, given 180 million of acres insured under RP in 2013.  
Table 10. Statistics of per acre underwriting losses cost paid by taxpayers by policy and coverage 
level 
  Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85% 
RP 
Mean 2.2  2.6  3.0  3.4  
Standard Deviation 10.3  12.5  14.9  17.2  
Minimum (9.6) (12.5) (16.1) (20.2) 
Maximum 80.7  93.8  105.5  115.2  
VAR(95%) 23.5  28.4  33.6  38.8  
VAR(90%) 17.3  21.0  25.0  28.8  
RP-HPE 
Mean 1.8  2.1  2.5  2.8  
Standard Deviation 8.9  11.1  13.5  16.1  
Minimum (10.4) (13.8) (18.0) (23.2) 
Maximum 84.0  98.5  111.9  123.7  
VAR(95%) 18.1  22.5  27.8  33.2  
VAR(90%) 11.8  14.9  18.4  22.3  
Difference 
Mean 0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  
Standard Deviation 1.4  1.4  1.4  1.1  
Minimum 0.9  1.3  1.9  3.0  
( RP - RP-HPE) Maximum (3.3) (4.7) (6.4) (8.5) 
VAR(95%) 5.4  5.9  5.9  5.6  
VAR(90%) 5.5  6.2  6.5  6.5  
Note: Results are based on 26000 simulated underwriting losses. All values are expressed in dollars. 
 
Table 11. Premium and premium subsidies for RP and RP-HPE by coverage level 
  Coverage Level 70% 75% 80% 85% 
Premium 
RP 5.67 7.31 9.36 11.87 
RP-HPE 4.69 6.04 7.71 9.76 
Premium Subsidies 
Subsidy factor 0.59 0.55 0.48 0.38 
RP 3.34 4.02 4.49 4.51 
RP-HPE 2.77 3.32 3.70 3.71 
Difference in subsidies 0.57 0.70 0.79 0.80 
Note: Values are in billions of dollars. Premium for each insurance plan is the sum amount for five crops: corn, soybeans, 
cotton, spring wheat and winter wheat. 
     
     Second, since all the insurance policies are heavily subsidized in premium, elimination 
of premium subsidies would be the biggest portion of the total savings. As shown in Table 11, 
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the total premium is about $11.87 billion if all the contracts are insured with 85% coverage of 
RP, $4.51 billion of which is paid by taxpayers. If all the contracts are insured under RP-HPE, 
then the taxpayers’ cost would be down to $3.71 billion, which is $800 million less. 
     Third, FCIC also subsidizes the insurance firms for the administrative and operating 
expenses, which are about 20% of the total premium for each policy. Due to the lower 
premiums for RP-HPE, the shift from RP to RP-HPE would save taxpayers another $195 
million to $421 million. So taking into account the savings in underwriting loss sharing, 
premium subsidies, and subsidies for operating expenses, replacing RP with RP-HPE would 
save taxpayers $1.33 billion in total given all the contracts are insured with 85% coverage 
level, which is about $400 million more than CBO’s estimate in 2013, but only 67% of its 
estimate in 2015. 
 
Conclusions 
     Based on the stochastic model developed by Babcock and Paulson (2012), the risk 
from providing crop yield and revenue insurance can be quantified and is found to be far 
greater than the level of risk in conventional private insurance markets. As a result, crop 
insurance would not be active without government’s involvement. After obtaining 
reinsurance from FCIC, insurance firms are expected to extract positive net underwriting 
gains under all six insurance policies. Furthermore, the elimination of premium subsidies on 
harvest price option and the anticipated shift of producers to RP-HPE would have saved 
taxpayers up to $1.33 billion per year given all the RP farmers switch to RP-HPE, which is 
about $400 million more than CBO’s estimate in 2013 but $600 million less than its estimate 
in 2015.  
     Note that all this analysis conducted on crop insurance is a one-year cost projection. 
Thus, a natural, but quite crucial, question arises: what is an appropriate way of analyzing 
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agricultural programs in a dynamic setting, as most policies are implemented for many years. 
At first look, extending the analysis to multiple years seems straightforward, but simply 
repeating this procedure in a dynamic world may bias our calculations, due to lack of 
consideration of serial correlation and increasing price volatilities over time. To formally 
explore this question, a three-crop storage model is adopted, which is discussed in the next 
chapter, as a better approach for the multiple-year projections. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STORAGE MODEL 
 
Introduction 
     The competitive storage model under rational expectations has attracted great attention 
from economists, because its derivation is based on a microeconomic foundation that 
incorporates demand, supply and storage. The model has been widely adopted to understand 
the complexity of commodity price dynamics. Deaton and Laroque (1992) made the first 
attempt to estimate the serial dependence among twelve major commodity prices by using the 
storage model. Their paper concluded that the storage model could introduce some 
autocorrelation of price but the degree was far below what was actually observed in price 
data. However, based on Deaton and Laroque’s work, Cafiero et al. (2011) showed that 
employing a much finer grid to approximate the equilibrium price function would produce 
quite different results. They conclude that the storage model is capable of explaining the high 
serial correlations observed in price data for the twelve major commodities under study.  
     The storage model is increasingly used to simulate the impacts of alternative policy 
scenarios. Miranda and Helmberger (1988) developed a one-commodity storage model to 
analyze the long-run impacts of price stabilization programs on soybean market prices. They 
found that the programs would essentially decrease the long-run market price of soybeans 
and also destabilize producers’ revenue even though they were initiated to support and 
stabilize price. Roberts and Tran (2012) researched the impacts of a large and permanent 
demand shift on food prices by using a one-crop storage model. They argue that about 11% to 
30% of the increase in food price is the result of U.S. ethanol mandate which shifted the 
world demand by more than 5%. 
 
35 
 
 Lence and Hayes (2002) were the first to generalize the storage model to a 
three-commodity framework which allows output substitution effects among crops. Their 
two-period generalized model was then used to solve the equilibrium variables, such as 
production, price, planted acres and storage, under three different policy scenarios: a 
free-market regime, the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 
regime and the regime that preceded the FAIR Act. Their results showed that FAIR Act could 
not account for the significant increases in long-run price volatility or revenue volatility. In 
this chapter, I present a three crop storage model that can be used to generate serially 
correlated price deviates that are used to provide better estimates of the cost of agricultural 
commodity programs. 
 
Model Setup 
     Unlike Chapter 2, the focus of this chapter is restricted to three storable commodities: 
corn, soybeans and wheat, because the reference price for Price Loss Coverage (PLC), one of 
the programs that will be evaluated, does not differentiate between spring and winter wheat. 
Reducing the number of crops from four to three also makes the model more computationally 
tractable because it reduces the “curse of dimensionality” (Judd, 1998). 
     At any time period t, the total available amount of commodity  j  (j = 1, 2, 3), denoted 
as TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 , is composed of the inventory carried over from previous year 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1, the new 
production 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈, which equals the product of the acreage planted at time t − 1 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1 and the 
yield 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈  
 TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = I𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1 + Q𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = I𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 (13) 
Part of the total supply is used for current consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 and the rest is saved for next 
period 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 
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 TAjt = cjt + Ijt (14) 
The demand function for commodity j is assumed to be the following: 
 cjt = D�pjt� = ( pjtαjdejt)γjd (15) 
 pjt = αjdejdt(cjt)1/γjd (16) 
where αjd > 0,−1 < γjd < 0 and |γjd| is the demand elasticity. ejdt is the demand shock, 
which is assumed to be a random walk. The error term  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈  of demand shock is 
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑2 . Formally, 
 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 ,  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑2 ) (17) 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑0 + �𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈
𝑖𝑖=1
 (18) 
I further assume the error term at time 0 (year 2013) is realized and equal to 1, that is  
 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑0 = 1 (19) 
Therefore 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈  , the demand shock at time t, is normally distributed with mean 1 and 
variance 𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑2 . 
     The planting decisions are made one period ahead and based on per acre expected 
revenues in the next period. If there is no constraint for total acreage planted, then acreage 
supply for commodity j is given as follows 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ln (𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1))3
𝑗𝑗=1
, j = 1, 2, 3 (20) 
In equation (20), 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 0 for j = 1, 2, 3 ensures that the acreage responds positively to its 
own per acre revenue;  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 < 0 for 𝑗𝑗 ≠ k reflects the substitution effects among crops; 
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 03𝑗𝑗=1  makes sure that the acreage planted for commodity 𝑗𝑗 would increase if all 
the commodities’ per acre expected revenues increase by the same proportion.  
 
37 
 
     As in Lence and Hayes (2002), I restrict total acreage to be A and assume the 
constrained acreage supply 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 is proportional to the unconstrained supply 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼. That is 
 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴
= 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼
∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼3
𝑖𝑖=1
 (21) 
Combined with equation (20), I have 
 ln𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 = 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ln (𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1))3
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 − ln��𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼3
𝑖𝑖=1
� ,
j = 1, 2, 3 (22) 
 ln𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 = 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ln (𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1))3
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴
− ln {�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑗𝑗=1
3
𝑖𝑖=1
} (23) 
     I include convenience yield to account for the reality that some inventories are carried 
even when the expected price increase is not enough to cover conventional storage costs. This 
stockholding activity is explained by the benefit of physically holding the commodity. With 
storage, stockholders can use the commodity as needed. For example, the inventory can be 
used to make profits from temporary shortage or keep a production process running smoothly.  
  Furthermore, by incorporating convenience yield, Rui and Miranda (1995) were able 
to explain the high serial correlation observed in primary commodity prices based on Deaton 
and Laroque’s model, which instead assumed a constant return to the storage16 and failed to 
generate highly auto-correlated prices. As Rui and Miranda (1995) pointed out, the 
assumption that a fixed portion of inventory depreciated over time is equivalent to imposing a 
decreasing function of the marginal storage cost in the stock level, which results in a failure 
to explain the observed high autocorrelation of prices. 
                                                              
16 A constant return to the storage means one unit of storable commodity at time 𝑡𝑡 will be (1 − 𝛿𝛿) remained if carried 
over to 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
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     Convenience yield can be modeled as an unobservable negative storage cost. Thus the 
storage cost per unit consists of the marginal physical storage cost and the marginal 
convenience yield (MCY). MCY is assumed to be large when the inventory is small, 
ultimately leading to a negative storage cost per unit and decreases as inventories increase. 
Following Kaldor (1939), Rui and Miranda (1995), and Tomek (1997), I assume MCY of 
commodity 𝑗𝑗 has the following form17: 
 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌�𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈� = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐exp (−𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈) (24) 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 > 0, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 > 0 captures that MCY is decreasing in the stock level. 
     The intertemporal arbitrage conditions for competitive and risk-neutral storers are 
given as following: 
 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1�1 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗      𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 (25) 
     In equation (25), 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1� is the price expectation for the next period from the 
standpoint of time t, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the marginal storage cost of commodity 𝑗𝑗 assumed to be a 
constant, and r is the interest rate. Equation (25) says that, if the benefit of storing an 
additional unit of commodity for the next period is greater than the current price plus the 
marginal storage cost, then stockholders would increase the amount carried to the next period. 
Such storage would lead to a decrease in current consumption, and therefore, an increase in 
the current price. When the current price increases, the difference between the marginal 
benefit and current price shrinks until it equals the unit storage cost. Similarly, if the benefit 
of carrying one more unit of commodity is less than the current price plus the marginal 
storage cost, then storers will store less, resulting in an increase in current consumption and 
thus a decline in the current price utill the marginal benefit equals the current price plus the 
                                                              
17 The function form that adopted in Rui and Miranda (1995) for MCY is: MCY = 𝛽𝛽 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈� , where β is a constant that needs to 
be calibrated. 
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marginal storage cost. So in the equilibrium, the benefit of storing an extra unit of commodity 
is equal to the cost of that. Furthuermore, possibilities of stockouts are eliminated because of 
the convenience yield. 
 
Solving the Storage Model 
     Solving the storage model (13)-(25) requires stochastic dynamic programming. As 
documented in the literature, more than one way can be used to solve the rational expectation 
storage model. Following Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1995 and 1996), I approximate optimal 
storage as a function of the state variables18. The natural state variables are the total amount 
available for each crop. Specifically, 
 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈)    𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 (26) 
     In general, the closed form of 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 cannot be derived. However, numerical methods can 
be used to approximate the function. Here I adopt the collocation method. The basic idea is to 
approximate the unknown function 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 using a linear combination of n = ∏ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗3𝑗𝑗=1  known 
independent basis functions 
 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈) ≈ 𝑈𝑈�𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈)
= � � � 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖3𝑗𝑗 𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1(TA1𝑈𝑈)𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2(TA2𝑈𝑈)𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3(TA3𝑈𝑈)𝐼𝐼3
𝑖𝑖3=1
𝐼𝐼2
𝑖𝑖2=1
𝐼𝐼1
𝑖𝑖1=1
 
(27) 
where �(𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗1, … ,𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)|k = 1, 2, 3� is a 1 × 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  vector of univariate basis functions. For 
each commodity 𝑗𝑗, eight Chebychev nodes are used to solve the storage model. As a result, 
there are n = 83 = 512 coefficients {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖3𝑗𝑗 }𝑖𝑖1=1,…,𝐼𝐼1;𝑖𝑖2=1,…,𝐼𝐼2;𝑖𝑖3=1,…,𝐼𝐼3to be determined for 
each commodity 𝑗𝑗. I solve for these coefficients by an iteration process described later. 
Equation (25) can be rewritten as 
                                                              
18 Lence and Hayes (2002) approximated price expectations as a function of inventories. 
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 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈{αjdejdt+1[TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈+1)]1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� }1 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈�𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈�= αjdejdt(TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 − 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈)1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� + 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 (28) 
The uncertainty in equation (28) comes from future random yields ( 𝑦𝑦1𝑈𝑈+1,𝑦𝑦2𝑈𝑈+1,𝑦𝑦3𝑈𝑈+1) and 
demand shocks  (𝑈𝑈1𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈+1, 𝑈𝑈2𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈+1, 𝑈𝑈3𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈+1) . Thus calculating expected prices requires 
multi-dimensional integration over all possible yield and demand shock values. Empirical 
yield distributions are used in this analysis. Yields are assumed to be independent from 
demand shocks. Monte Carlo methods are applied to integrate over the yield distributions. 
For each demand shock, ten Gaussian quadrature nodes and their corresponding weights are 
generated from a normal distribution with a specified mean and a calibrated variance. 
Equations (29) and (31) below give the specific expressions of the approximated expected 
price and the approximated per acre expected revenue in terms of 53*3 empirical yield draws, 
the generated ten Gaussian quadrature nodes and their corresponding weights. 
  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1� = 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈{αjdejdt+1[TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈+1)]1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� }
≈  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1�
= �𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖10
𝑖𝑖=1
αjdz𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 � 153�[I𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗53
𝑗𝑗=1
− 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(I1𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦1𝑗𝑗 , I2𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦2𝑗𝑗 , I3𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦3𝑗𝑗)]1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� � 
(29) 
 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1)
= 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈 �αjdejdt+1�TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈+1,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈+1)�1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1� (30) 
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  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1)
= �𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖10
𝑖𝑖=1
αjdz𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 � 153�[I𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗53
𝑗𝑗=1
− 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(I1𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦1𝑗𝑗 , I2𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦2𝑗𝑗 , I3𝑈𝑈 + 𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦3𝑗𝑗)]1 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗� 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗� 
(31) 
where �𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖|𝑈𝑈 = 1, … ,10� are the ten Gaussian quadrature nodes for the demand shock of 
commodity 𝑗𝑗, {𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖|𝑈𝑈 = 1, … ,10} are the associated weights. {( 𝑦𝑦1𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦2𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦3𝑗𝑗)|𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,53} 
are 53 sets of empirical yield draws. They are drawn from the same historical year to 
maintain the spatial correlations among crop yields. 
Substitution of equation (29) into (25) yields 
  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1�1 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈(𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈) = 𝐷𝐷−1(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 − 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈) + 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 (32) 
The acreage supply in equation (23) can be rewritten as 
 ln𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 = 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ln ( 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1))𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑙𝑙𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴
− ln {�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�(𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈+1)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽
𝑖𝑖=1
} (33) 
Equation (32) and (33) are then used to solve the undetermined 512*3 coefficients {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖3𝑗𝑗 }𝑖𝑖1=1,…,𝐼𝐼1;𝑖𝑖2=1,…,𝐼𝐼2;𝑖𝑖3=1,…,𝐼𝐼3; 𝑗𝑗=1,2,3.  The specific iteration process is listed in the 
following: 
1. Define the domain of function 𝑈𝑈�  as [𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴1𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] × [𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴2𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] ×[𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴3𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚]  and then construct 1 × 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 vector of Chebychev nodes 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 =(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)  over the interval [𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚]𝑗𝑗=1,2,3  for the state variable TA𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗=1,2,3.  
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𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 + 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2 + 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼2 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 − 𝑈𝑈 + 0.5𝑈𝑈 𝜋𝜋� ,
𝑘𝑘 = 1, 2, 3;  𝑈𝑈 = 1, … ,𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 (34) 
A grid of n = ∏ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗3𝑗𝑗=1  interpolation nodes can be formed by Cartesian product19 of the 
univariate interpolation nodes {𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗=1,2,3  
 {(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖2 , 𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖3)|𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 , 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,3} (35) 
where �𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�  is the range of total amount available (new production + 
inventory) for commodity 𝑗𝑗, defined as [10, 20] × [2.6, 7] × [2.5, 4] in this study for 
corn, soybeans and wheat with the values in billions of bushels. 
2. Construct the n = ∏ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 83 = 5123𝑗𝑗=1  independent Chebychev polynomials  �𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1,…,𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖;𝑗𝑗=1,…,3 using the tensor product20 of the univariate interpolation 
polynomials, which are defined on the domain [−1, 1]. 
3. Define 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 below to normalize the domain to the interval [−1, 1]. 
 {𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 2(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼)𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 − 1| 𝑘𝑘 = 1, 2, 3;  𝑈𝑈 = 1, … ,𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 } (36) 
Evaluate the n independent Chebychev polynomials  �𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1,…,𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖;𝑗𝑗=1,…,3 at 
normalized node (𝑍𝑍1𝑖𝑖1 ,𝑍𝑍2𝑖𝑖2 ,𝑍𝑍3𝑖𝑖3), which produces a 1 × n matrix.  
4. Given an arbitrary starting value c0𝑗𝑗 (n × 1 matrix) for coefficients, I obtain   
 
𝑈𝑈�𝑗𝑗(𝑍𝑍1𝑖𝑖1 ,𝑍𝑍2𝑖𝑖2 ,𝑍𝑍3𝑖𝑖3), = � � � 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖30𝑗𝑗 𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1(𝑍𝑍1𝑖𝑖1)𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2(𝑍𝑍2𝑖𝑖2)𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3(𝑍𝑍3𝑖𝑖3)𝐼𝐼3
𝑖𝑖3=1
𝐼𝐼2
𝑖𝑖2=1
𝐼𝐼1
𝑖𝑖1=1
 (37) 
5. Substitute equation (37) into both non-arbitrage conditions (32) and acreage supply 
functions (33). 
6. Plug in the first Chebychev node 𝑍𝑍1 = (𝑍𝑍11,𝑍𝑍21,𝑍𝑍31) defined based on current total 
                                                              
19 Cartesian product is a mathematical operation which returns a set from multiple sets. That is, for sets A and B, the 
Cartesian product 𝐴𝐴 ×  𝐵𝐵 is the set of all ordered pairs (𝑆𝑆, 𝑏𝑏) where 𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝐵𝐵. 
20 Tensor product denoted by ⊗, If 𝐴𝐴 = [1  𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥12], 𝐵𝐵 = [1 𝑥𝑥2], then 𝐴𝐴⊗ B = [1  𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥12 𝑥𝑥2 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2 𝑥𝑥12𝑥𝑥2], which has 6 
columns. 
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supplies, solve for 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = (𝐼𝐼1𝑈𝑈 , 𝐼𝐼2𝑈𝑈 , 𝐼𝐼3𝑈𝑈) and 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈 = (𝐴𝐴1𝑈𝑈 ,𝐴𝐴2𝑈𝑈 ,𝐴𝐴3𝑈𝑈), denoted as 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈1 and 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈1. 
7. Repeat step 6 for all the remaining Chebychev nodes, then I have n values of 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈, �
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈
1
⋮
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈
𝐼𝐼
�, 
which corresponds to �
𝑍𝑍1
⋮
𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼
� , and get the updated coefficient 𝑐𝑐1 = Φ−1 �𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈1⋮
𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈
𝐼𝐼
�, where Φ 
is a n × n matrix, obtained by evaluating the n independent Chebychev polynomials 
 �𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1,…,𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖;𝑗𝑗=1,…,3 at each of the n interpolation nodes �𝑍𝑍1⋮
𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼
�. 
8. Replace 𝑐𝑐0 with 𝑐𝑐1 and repeat step 5-7 until coefficients c converge21 to 𝑐𝑐∗ 
Then I have  
 
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
∗ = � � � 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖3𝑗𝑗∗ 𝜙𝜙1𝑖𝑖1(𝑍𝑍1𝑖𝑖1)𝜙𝜙2𝑖𝑖2(𝑍𝑍2𝑖𝑖2)𝜙𝜙3𝑖𝑖3(𝑍𝑍3𝑖𝑖3)𝐼𝐼3
𝑖𝑖3=1
𝐼𝐼2
𝑖𝑖2=1
𝐼𝐼1
𝑖𝑖1=1
 (38) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗=1,2,3 is the normalized total supply of commodity 𝑗𝑗 at time t built in 
equation (36).  
     The Chebychev nodes and polynomials are calculated by using the Matlab package 
developed by Miranda and Fackler (2002). The full Matlab codes implemented to solve 
the storage model are attached as an appendix to this chapter. 
 
Data and methodology 
     Historical county-level and national-level yield data over 1961-2013 were collected for 
corn and soybeans from NASS. For wheat, the same periods of national-level yields were 
also assembled, but the county-level yields are not available for 2008-2013 from NASS. As a 
result, county-level production and acreage planted data on spring and winter wheat over 
1961-2013 were collected to calculate the corresponding county-level yields on wheat.  
                                                              
21 The tolerance for convergence is 10−7. 
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     As in Chapter 2, I only include counties with at least 20 years’ historical yield data over 
1990-2013 into the analysis. Irrigated and non-irrigated practices are treated separately in 
calculating the program payments, which are then averaged by their respective acreage to 
obtain the averaged payments. However, the farm-level yield variabilities are not calibrated, 
because individual-based ARC is not a main focus in this analysis as it was rarely selected by 
farmers. In 2015, only 1% of base acres are enrolled under ARC-individual while 76% of 
base acres are enrolled under ARC-county. The remaining 23% of base acres are enrolled 
under PLC22. In order to compare with county-based ARC, the program background on 
individual-based ARC will be provided in Chapter 4.  
     A big difference from Chapter 2 lies in the model adopted to simulate price draws. To 
my knowledge, the present study is the first one that employs a three-crop rational 
expectation storage model to simulate intertemporally correlated prices and then apply them 
to evaluate commodity programs.  
 
Calibrating model parameters 
     Yield Distribution. For each commodity 𝑗𝑗, the historical national-level yield draws 
are detrended to their 2014-equivalents: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 = 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2014𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  , t = 1961, … ,2013; j = 1, 2, 3. (39) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2014𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is U.S. trended yield in 2014. 
The detrended national corn yield 𝑌𝑌1𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 has a mean of 169.01 bushel per acre and standard 
deviation of 16.65, while the detrended national soybeans yield 𝑌𝑌2𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 has a mean of 44.96 
and standard deviation of 3.08. For wheat, the mean and the standard deviation are 47.38 and 
3.33, respectively.  
                                                              
22 https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index 
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     Demand Function. The demand shock for each crop is assumed to be a random walk: 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈 ,  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑈𝑈~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑2 ), where 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑  is calibrated with demand elasticities to 
achieve the three price-related targets which are discussed in the following section. The 
calibrated standard deviations are 0.15 for corn, 0.14 for soybeans and 0.13 for wheat. The 
respective demand elasticities for corn, soybeans and wheat are calibrated to be (-0.56, -0.45, 
-0.15). Furthermore, the total usage and average prices received by farmer in 2013 marketing 
year are collected to calibrate the constants �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑�𝑗𝑗=1,2,3in the demand functions. The total 
usage of corn, soybeans and wheat are 13.454 billion bushels, 3.478 billion bushels and 2.436 
billion bushels, respectively. The average prices received by farmers are $4.46 per bushel for 
corn, $13 per bushel for soybeans and $6.87 per bushel for wheat. Thus the parameters in 
equation (14) are: 𝛼𝛼1𝑑𝑑 = 462.5,𝛼𝛼2𝑑𝑑 = 207.4,𝛼𝛼3𝑑𝑑 = 2598.9. 
     Acreage Supply. For illustration purposes, the own supply elasticities 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 for j =1, 2, 3 are assumed to be 0.2 and the cross elasticities 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 ≠ k are assumed to be -0.08. 
The constant parameter in the acreage supply function of commodity j is set to a level such 
that given this parameter, the supply elasticities and expected revenue for the 2014 market 
year of commodity j, the producers would plant the acreage that matches the observed 
planted acre of commodity j in 2014. The own price-yield correlations are needed to calculate 
the expected revenue Et(pkt+1ykt+1): 
 Et(pkt+1ykt+1) = Et(pkt+1)Et(ykt+1) + COV(pkt+1, ykt+1) (40) 
Similar to Chapter 2, the projected prices and harvest prices for the period of 2000-2012 were 
collected from RMA to measure the historical price-yield correlations among corn, soybeans, 
spring wheat and winter wheat. Wheat price-yield correlation is the production-weighted 
average of that for spring and winter wheat. Expected price for each crop is obtained from its 
corresponding futures market. For corn, I use the average daily settlement price of December 
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2014 corn futures contract over the 2013 market year23 to approximate the expected price for 
the 2014 market year. Expected yield for each crop is set to its average detrended yield in 
2014. For wheat, I get the expected revenue by averaging the expected revenue of spring 
wheat and winter wheat using their respective outputs. In addition, following Lence and 
Hayes (2002), the total planted acreage in 2014 for these three crops is assumed to be 98% of 
the land that could be planted to these three crops in order to calibrate the constant parameters. 
Thus I have 𝛼𝛼1𝑗𝑗 = 0.0644, 𝛼𝛼2𝑗𝑗 = 0.0660, and 𝛼𝛼3𝑗𝑗 = 0.0507. 
     Marginal Convenience Yield. MCY is calibrated using storers’ non-arbitrage 
conditions: 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡+1�
1+𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 + 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗   𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 . Averaged prices received by farmers in 
both crop year 2002/03 and 2012/13 are collected as spot prices. The average daily settlement 
prices over the same crop years of harvest futures contract are assembled as expected prices. 
For wheat, I average the expected price of spring and winter wheat using their production as 
weights. Annual storage cost is assumed to $0.36 per bushel for all three crops. The interest 
rate is set to be 5.26% to allow a depreciation rate of 95%. Below are the calibrated 
constants: 
 (𝛼𝛼1𝑐𝑐 ,𝛼𝛼2𝑐𝑐 ,𝛼𝛼3𝑐𝑐) = (190.025, 158.148, 9.432) (41) 
 (𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 ,𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐 ,𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐) = (5.638, 29.272, 5.542) (42) 
The calibrated MCY for corn, soybeans and wheat are shown in the following three figures. 
Dots marked in red are the two crop years used for calibration while the blue ones present the 
2014 stock level. The charts below indicate that there is almost no convenience benefit to 
store any additional units of corn for 2015 while it is worth 59 cents and 15 cents respectively 
for soybeans and wheat farmers to carry one more unit to the 2015 crop year. 
 
                                                              
23 Since I am using market year average price as the spot price, so it is better to be consistent to take the average daily 
settlement price of harvest furtures contract over the same market year. 
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     Figure 12 below displays the approximated optimal storage function for corn given low 
supply of both soybeans and wheat. The corresponding charts are listed in Figure 13 and 14 
for soybeans and wheat. All of them show that the optimal storage is an increasing function 
of the crop’s total supply. Given a positive crop yield shock, the total supply of that crop 
would increase, which would then lead the current price for that crop to decline, and therefore 
incentivize the storers to carry more to the next period until the new equilibrium is restored.  
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Simulating harvest prices 
     Since this study is to project five-year (2014-2018) program payments from the 
perspective of the crop year 2013, I randomly draw a five-year national yield series from the 
53 detrended histories with replacement and repeat the process 5000 times to create enough 
yield samples for each crop. In the meanwhile, in order to maintain the spatial correlations 
among crops, yields are drawn from the same random years across crops. For example, if the 
first five yields are drawn from years (1961, 2004, 2010, 1980 and 1961) for corn, then the 
same five-year yields are selected for both soybeans and wheat. As a result, 5000 five-year 
sequences of national yields are generated for each crop and applied to the solved storage 
model to simulate expected harvest prices. Below is the detailed procedure. 
1) Input year 2013 ending stock, year 2014 planted acreage and simulated year 2014 
national yield draw (the first element in the first five-year yield draws) into the 
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equation below to calculate TA𝑗𝑗2014, the total amount of supply for commodity j in 
2014. 
 TA𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 = I𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1 + 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈−1𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈   𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3. (43) 
2) Solve for these three variables for each commodity: the ending stock in 2014, the 
price realized in 2014, and the optimal acreage planted in 2015, which depends on 
expected price.  
3) The solved storage and acreage are then combined with simulated year 2015 yield 
(the second element in the first five-year yield draws) to get total amount of supply in 
2015, and repeat step 2 to solve the corresponding three variables for crop year 2015. 
4) Continue the process for 2016-2018 until the first sequence of five yields are all 
adopted, which would generate a series of five-year prices for each crop.  
5) Repeat steps 1-4 with the remaining 4999 five-year yield draws to simulate the 
corresponding 4999 five-year price series. As a result, 5000 prices will be simulated 
for each crop and year of 2014-2018. 
     My purpose in using the storage model to generate prices is to have the prices reflect 
three market realities. The first is the level of annual (one year ahead) price volatility 
exhibited by corn, soybean, and wheat prices. Second, as shown by Lence, Hart and Hayes 
(2009), price volatility increases at a decreasing rate, but slower than at a rate equal to the 
square root of time due to mean reversion. And third, prices are serially correlated. The 
instruments I use to calibrate the model are the demand elasticity and the standard deviation 
of the demand random walk term. More inelastic demand increases price volatility and 
decreases serial correlation. A larger standard error increases price volatility and increases 
serial correlation. Because I have only two instruments and three targets, I cannot hit all the 
targets exactly. The target for base year price volatilities are to match their historical levels, 
which are 22% for corn, 20% for soybeans and 19% for wheat. These volatilities equal the 
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standard deviation of the annual percentage change in prices over 1980-2014. Second, the 
amount of serial correlations can be quite close to the levels observed in the historical prices. 
The price data over 1950-2014 are assembled and fitted with a second degree polynomial 
time trend. The Pearson correlation between the residual and its lag is calculated to 
approximate the serial correlations in prices. The estimated autocorrelations are 0.73 for corn, 
0.76 for soybeans and 0.72 for wheat. The third target, how much price volatility should 
deviate from increasing at a rate equal to the square root of time is rather poorly defined. 
Given the short time period (five years) of this analysis, I deem to have hit this third target as 
long as price volatility is a concave function of time 𝑡𝑡, as stated in Lence, Hart and Hayes 
(2009). 
 
Discussions 
     As there is no closed form of price volatilities in terms of the two instruments that I 
manipulate to achieve those three targets, I tried about 250 combinations of those parameters 
to find a ideal set. I found the following: 
1. Larger demand elasticity or more elastic demand would produce a lower base year 
(2014) price volatility and a stronger price serial correlation. The reason is that with a 
more elastic demand, prices are less sensitive to the changes in quantities, and 
therefore given a same yield shock, elastic demand would respond with a smaller 
change in prices, which results in a lower price volatility and stronger serial 
dependence.  
2. Larger standard deviation of the error term in demand shock increases the base year 
(2014) price volatility but also the serial correlation. It is one of the two sources that 
bring in the uncertainty to the model. If the demand shock is more volatile, then it is 
natural to observe more variable prices. Furthermore, the demand shock is modeled to 
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be a random walk which accumulates the impacts over periods and therefore increases 
serial correlations. In addition, larger standard deviation would also increase the 
likelihood of price volatility to be concave due to the concavity in the variance of the 
random walk. 
     Table 12 reports the mean and volatility of simulated prices under three different 
sets of parameters. The corresponding charts of price volatilities are displayed in Figures 
15 - 17. The serial correlations under each set of parameters are presented in Table 14, 
which are obtained by two steps: 1) line up the first price draw of 2014 with that of 2015 
until the 5000th draw of 2017 is paired with 5000th draw of 2018; 2) calculate the Pearson 
correlation between these 20,000 price pairs and take it as an approximation of serial 
correlation in simulated prices. 
     Parameter Set I is the ideal set and will be applied to evaluate ARC, PLC and SCO 
in the next chapter. It achieved both the target on the base year volatilities and that on 
increasing and concave pattern of volatilities. Although it did not exactly meet the desired 
level of serial correlation, it came close. The level of serial correlation for soybeans and 
wheat are a bit higher than their targets.  
     Compared to Set I, Set II changes the corn demand elasticity from 0.56 to 0.6. This 
leads to a slight decrease in base year volatility (22.3% to 21.6%). However, the increase 
in demand elasticity improves the serial correlations in corn prices (0.728 to 0.75).  
     The comparison of Set I versus Set III demonstrates the impacts on price volatility 
and serial dependence from adjusting the standard deviation of the error term in corn 
demand shock. The result shows higher standard deviation leads to higher base year 
volatility (22.3% to 26%) and also strengthens the serial correlations in corn prices (0.728 
to 0.815).  
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     Instead of having two instruments, I also investigate the possibility of having only 
one instrument and fixing the demand elasticities at their conventional levels24. The 
results are displayed in Table 13. It shares the same pattern as that in Table 12 regarding 
standard deviation. However, Set IV fails to meet all three targets. In particular, a more 
inelastic corn demand, holding the standard deviation of the random walk term constant, 
results in a near-constant price volatility over time. With higher standard deviation in corn, 
it starts to show concavity in price volatility, but the base year volatility is too high for 
corn. Furthermore, the serial correlation for wheat is way too far from its historical level 
while that for corn is relatively low compared to its historical value. This last example 
shows the difficulty in calibrating the storage model and the interdependence of the 
demand elasticity, demand shocks, and yield volatilities in determining how prices behave 
over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
24 The conventional levels are taken from the current literature. I calculate the production-weighted elasticity based on the 
literature’s elasticity for each demand component. For example, corn demand elasticity is the production-weighted average 
of that for export demand, feed demand, food demand and ethanol demand. 
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Table 12. Simulated crop prices and their volatilities by different sets of parameters 
Parameter Set I: 
Demand elasticities=[-0.56; -0.45; -0.15] for corn, soybeans and wheat, respectively; 
Sigma=[0.15, 0.14, 0.13] for corn, soybeans and wheat demand shock, respectively; 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.602 22.3% 10.863 19.6% 4.781 19.2% 
2015 3.628 27.1% 10.508 23.7% 4.860 25.2% 
2016 3.628 31.1% 10.423 27.4% 4.879 28.5% 
2017 3.637 34.4% 10.446 30.8% 4.888 31.7% 
2018 3.624 37.6% 10.392 33.6% 4.894 34.2% 
  
Parameter Set II: 
Demand elasticities=[-0.6; -0.45; -0.15] for corn, soybeans and wheat, respectively; 
Sigma=[0.15, 0.14, 0.13] for corn, soybeans and wheat demand shock, respectively; 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.639 21.6% 10.891 19.6% 4.807 19.2% 
2015 3.668 26.4% 10.533 23.6% 4.887 25.2% 
2016 3.668 30.5% 10.448 27.4% 4.907 28.4% 
2017 3.677 33.9% 10.471 30.8% 4.916 31.7% 
2018 3.665 37.1% 10.416 33.5% 4.922 34.2% 
  
Parameter Set III: 
Demand elasticities=[-0.56; -0.45; -0.15] for corn, soybeans and wheat, respectively; 
Sigma=[0.2, 0.14, 0.13] for corn, soybeans and wheat demand shock, respectively; 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.606 26.0% 10.861 19.6% 4.788 19.2% 
2015 3.633 32.9% 10.506 23.7% 4.867 25.2% 
2016 3.635 38.7% 10.422 27.5% 4.886 28.5% 
2017 3.643 43.4% 10.444 30.8% 4.895 31.7% 
2018 3.632 47.8% 10.390 33.6% 4.901 34.2% 
Note: Sigma is the standard deviation of the error term in demand shocks.  And units are $/bu for expected prices, which are 
the simple averages over 5000 simulated prices for each year and crop. 
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Table 13. Simulated crop prices and their volatilities under conventional demand 
elasticities 
Parameter Set IV: 
Demand elasticities=[-0.36; -0.58; -0.46] for corn, soybeans and wheat, respectively; 
Sigma=[0.01, 0.16, 0.17] for corn, soybeans and wheat demand shock, respectively; 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.461 24.0% 11.212 19.5% 5.574 18.6% 
2015 3.457 24.4% 10.953 25.0% 5.675 25.6% 
2016 3.445 24.4% 10.903 29.6% 5.708 30.6% 
2017 3.460 25.0% 10.932 33.6% 5.724 35.1% 
2018 3.438 24.7% 10.887 36.9% 5.734 38.9% 
  
Parameter Set V: 
Demand elasticities=[-0.36; -0.58; -0.46] for corn, soybeans and wheat, respectively; 
Sigma=[0.10, 0.16, 0.17] for corn, soybeans and wheat demand shock, respectively; 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.469 26.2% 11.212 19.5% 5.574 18.6% 
2015 3.467 28.3% 10.953 25.0% 5.675 25.6% 
2016 3.458 30.3% 10.903 29.6% 5.708 30.6% 
2017 3.471 32.0% 10.932 33.6% 5.724 35.1% 
2018 3.451 33.5% 10.887 36.9% 5.734 38.9% 
Note: Sigma is the standard deviation of the error term in demand shocks.  And units are $/bu for expected prices, which are 
the simple averages over 5000 simulated prices for each year and crop. 
 
Table 14. Serial correlations by different sets of parameters 
  Corn Price Soybeans Price Wheat Price 
Parameter Set I 0.728 0.795 0.804 
Parameter Set II 0.750 0.796 0.805 
Parameter Set III 0.815 0.795 0.804 
Parameter Set IV 0.155 0.873 0.944 
Parameter Set V 0.425 0.873 0.944 
Historical 0.725 0.762 0.717 
Note: Historical serial correlations are derived from crop price data over 1950-2014 available on NASS. 
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Conclusions 
     The storage model is capable of simulating serially correlated price draws with price 
volatilities that increase at a decreasing rate given the demand shock is modeled as a random 
walk. The results show that if the corn demand elasticity is set too low, then price volatility 
can increase over time, but only at a cost of having too high price volatility in the base year. 
However, if demand elasticities are added as another dimension of parameters to be 
calibrated, then both the base year volatility target and the increase in price volatility target 
can be met, although the serial correlations observed in wheat is still a little bit higher than its 
historical level. The storage model successfully incorporates serial dependence into the 
simulated prices. One potential way of improving the model performance on the second 
target is to have supply elasticities to be calibrated as well. And this could be explored as 
future work since there are many acreage combinations of supply elasticities functions that 
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would need to be explored. The price draws are created while maintaining the correlations 
between yields shocks because I use empirical yield distributions that maintain the spatial 
correlations of yield across different crops to simulate prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
61 
 
CHAPTER 4 
NEW COMMODITY PROGRAMS UNDER 2014 FARM BILL 
 
Introduction 
      The simulated price draws and empirical yield distributions generated in Chapter 3 are 
used to estimate the cost of the new safety net programs passed by Congress as part of the 
new farm bill. The safety net programs that will be examined include Agriculture Risk 
Coverage (ARC), Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO).  
     Farmers had to make a one-time, irrevocable decision between PLC and ARC, and then 
stick to their choice for the entire farm bill period. For those who failed to make a final 
decision, PLC was their default option. Congress passed these new programs ostensibly to 
save money. CBO estimated the cost of the program using their now standard way of 
stochastic scoring. CBO assumes a constant level of price volatility and makes projections 
about mean commodity prices. Price draws from year to year are independent. This method 
of estimating costs is not consistent with the fact that prices are serially correlated over time. 
Furthermore, the assumption of constant price volatility ignores the fact that serial correlation 
in price creates commodity price volatility that increases over time, albeit at a decreasing rate. 
One justification for using CBO’s assumption of constant price volatility is that conditional 
on a given level of expected price in a given year, price volatility in the next year may be 
approximately constant. However, the unconditional price volatility at the beginning of the 
projection period must increase over time because the level of expected price in the future is 
not known. As such, the CBO assumption should underestimate the actual expected costs of 
farm programs. The objective of this chapter is to estimate the magnitude of this 
underestimation and to determine whether there exists an easy fix for CBO to correct its 
method of estimating farm program costs. 
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 Besides CBO, the other important estimator of farm program costs is the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri. FAPRI 
maintains two separate but related U.S. crops models: a deterministic U.S. crops model and a 
stochastic U.S. crops model. The deterministic model is used primarily to develop baseline 
while the stochastic model is calibrated to the deterministic baseline. Specifically, the demand 
curve was shocked by an i.i.d error term to generate 500 sets of 10-year price projections 
from their stochastic model. The simulated prices might have some serial correlation because 
of the structure of the model. But their model is not a storage model and it does not have a 
random walk in terms of a demand shock. That is each demand shock occurs off a known 
mean demand and are i.i.d from year to year. Furthermore, the FAPRI model only shocks 
export demand. So price volatility does not increase over time. So although both CBO and 
FAPRI use stochastic scoring methods to determine expected program costs, neither use a 
method that accounts for increasing price volatility and serial correlation in prices. 
 
Overview of Programs 
     ARC is a revenue insurance program that covers ‘shallow losses’. It has both 
county-based and individual-based options and covers per acre revenue shortfalls between 76 
percent and 86 percent coverage. For those who sign up for the ARC program, no premium 
would be charged for the coverage, and a payment would be made on 85 percent (65 percent) 
of the sum of base acres and generic acres planted to covered crops for county-based ARC 
(individual-based ARC). The payment for producers enrolled in county ARC is described as 
follows 
 PAY𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 = 0.85𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 min{max[(0.86𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 − 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑) , 0] , 0.1𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑} (44) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 is the base acre. 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 is the expected county revenue or the benchmark 
revenue defined as the product of the following (A) and (B): 
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(A)  Olympic average of county yields over the most recent five crop years, which is 
obtained by excluding the highest and lowest yields and then taking the average; 
(B)  Olympic average of national market year average (MYA) prices in last five crop 
years, which is similarly obtained as that for yield; 
According to 2014 Farm Bill, if the yield for any of the most recent five years is less than 70% 
of the transitional yield, it will be replaced with 70% of the transitional yield to construct the 
Olympic average in subparagraph (A). In this study, I replaced it with 70% of the county 
trend yield. 
     In subparagraph (B), if the national MYA price for any of the most recent five years is 
lower than the reference price set for the covered commodity, it will be replaced with the 
corresponding reference price. The reference price is $3.70 per bushel for corn, $8.40 per 
bushel for soybeans and $5.50 per bushel for wheat. 
𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 is the actual county revenue, which is the product of these two items: 
(C) The actual average county yield for the covered commodity;  
(D) The higher of  
i. The national average market price received by producers during the 12-month 
marketing year for the covered commodity; 
ii. The national average loan rate ($1.95 per bushel for corn, $5.00 per bushel for 
soybeans and $2.94 per bushel for wheat) for a marketing assistance loan for the 
covered commodity in effect for that crop year; 
As for those producers enrolled in individual ARC, their payments are given by 
 PAY𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 = 0.65𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 min{max[(0.86𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 − 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑) , 0] , 0.1𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑} (45) 
In equation (45), 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼  is the base acre. 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑  is the expected farm revenue or 
benchmark revenue for the farm, which is determined as follows: 
 
64 
 
(A)  For each covered commodity and each of the most recent five years, the revenue is 
calculated by multiplying the yield of the covered commodity by the national MYA 
price for that covered commodity; 
(B)  For each covered commodity, the benchmark revenue is obtained by calculating its 
Olympic average, which is the average revenue after excluding the highest and lowest 
values among the most recent five years.  
(C)  The benchmark revenue for the farm is obtained by weighting the amounts in 
subparagraph (B) using their planted acreage. 
Likewise, the low yield for any of the five most recent years will be updated to the 70 percent 
of the trend yield if it is less than 70% of the trend yield. The national MYA price in last five 
years will be replaced with the reference price if it is lower than that. 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 is the realized 
farm revenue, which is determined by: 
(D)  For each covered commodity, the realized revenue is the product of 
i. The total production of the covered commodity on such farms; 
ii. The higher of  
a. The national average market price received by producers during the 
12-month marketing year; 
b. The national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for the 
covered commodity in effect for that crop year; 
(E)  The sum of the amounts got from subparagraph (D) for all covered commodity on 
such farms; 
(F)  The quotient obtained by dividing the amount determined in subparagraph (E) by the 
total planted acres of all covered commodities on such farms. 
     PLC is a price support program like the eliminated counter cyclical program but with 
much higher target prices for most commodities. The target or reference prices are $3.70 per 
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bushel for corn, $8.40 per bushel for soybeans, and $5.50 per bushel for wheat. Farmers who 
enroll in PLC would receive a payment when the effective price of a crop is less than its 
reference price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓. The effective price is defined as the higher of the following two items: 
(A) The national average market price received by farmers during the 12-month 
marketing year 𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈; 
(B) The national average loan rate 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 , which is fixed at $1.95 per bushel for corn, 
$5.00 per bushel for soybeans and $2.94 per bushel for wheat. 
The payment is calculated as follows: 
 PAY𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 0.85𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴max [𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 − max(𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 ,𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼 ) , 0] (46) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 denotes the base acre. 𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the payment yield used for calculating counter 
cyclical program payments and it can be updated to 90 percent of the farm’s average yield per 
planted acre over the 2008-2012 crop years, excluding the crop year with zero acreage 
planted. And I assume all the farmers would update their payment yields to 90% of the 
average yield over 2008-2012.  
     SCO is a county-based insurance program that farmers can buy if they sign up for PLC. 
It will cover revenue losses between the coverage level chosen for farm-level revenue 
insurance and 86 percent coverage, so it is not overlapping with crop insurance. Farmers who 
sign up for ARC are not eligible to buy SCO. SCO premiums are subsidized at a 65 percent 
rate. Thus farmers who buy SCO only need to pay 35 percent premium in order to get a SCO 
payment which is listed in the following 
 PAY𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 min�max ��0.86 − 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑�(0.86 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) , 0� , 1� ∗ (0.86 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 
(47) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 is the expected county revenue calculated as the product of projected price 
and expected county yield. 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑑𝑑 is the realized county revenue. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the producer’s 
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coverage level for farm-level revenue insurance. 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 is the planted acre for covered 
commodities. The above formula says that if a producer selects a coverage of 75 percent, and 
if the actual county revenue is above 75 percent but less than 86 percent of expected county 
revenue, then he will be paid the difference between 0.86*ExpRev and ActRev, that is 0.86 ∗ExpRev −  ActRev, otherwise, he will be paid 0.86 ∗ ExpRev −  0.75 ∗ ExpRev. 
     As a benchmark, Babcock and Paulson’s stochastic model in 2012 is adopted to 
simulate serially uncorrelated price draws and then applied to ARC, PLC and SCO to 
estimate the program costs. It is denoted as the CBO scenario in this research because they 
were trying to emulate how CBO scores farm programs. In order to be comparable with the 
results from the storage model, the national yields that are used to simulate price draws are 
also randomly generated from the 53 yield histories with replacement. Furthermore, the 
resorted uniformly distributed draws are transformed to lognormal-distributed harvest price 
draws with mean and volatilities set equal to the corresponding levels projected by the 
storage model. The statistics (expected prices and volatilities) of the simulated prices from 
the storage model are listed in Table 15. For each commodity, the change in expected prices 
is limited over periods due to the “stationary” world built into this study. By “stationary” I 
mean that the average demand curve and the average supply curve are same across the 
five-year simulation. Furthermore, the yield distribution is held constant because I use the 
same empirical yield distribution for each year of the simulation.  
Table 15. The statistics of simulated prices from storage model by crop and year 
 
Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.602 22.3% 10.863 19.6% 4.781 19.2% 
2015 3.628 27.1% 10.508 23.7% 4.860 25.2% 
2016 3.628 31.1% 10.423 27.4% 4.879 28.5% 
2017 3.637 34.4% 10.446 30.8% 4.888 31.7% 
2018 3.624 37.6% 10.392 33.6% 4.894 34.2% 
Note: Units are $/bu for expected prices, which are the simple averages over the 5000 simulated prices for each year and crop. 
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Table 16. The statistics of simulated prices under CBO scenario by crop and year 
 
Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.611 22.0% 10.812 19.4% 4.770 19.1% 
2015 3.638 22.5% 10.478 19.8% 4.855 19.3% 
2016 3.649 22.3% 10.407 19.2% 4.866 19.3% 
2017 3.633 22.8% 10.449 19.7% 4.878 19.3% 
2018 3.624 22.5% 10.374 19.5% 4.903 19.2% 
Note: Units are $/bu for expected prices. They are set according to the storage model in order to be comparable. 
 
Table 17. The statistics of simulated prices with increasing volatility under CBO scenario 
by crop and year 
 
Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility Expected Price Volatility 
2014 3.611 22.0% 10.812 19.4% 4.770 19.1% 
2015 3.641 27.2% 10.473 23.8% 4.854 25.5% 
2016 3.656 31.2% 10.396 26.8% 4.861 28.7% 
2017 3.633 35.2% 10.453 31.0% 4.872 31.9% 
2018 3.626 37.9% 10.359 33.2% 4.910 34.1% 
Note: Units are $/bu for expected prices. They are set according to the storage model in order to be comparable. 
 
Table 18. Serial correlations under CBO scenario 
  Corn Price Soybeans Price Wheat Price 
Fixed Price Volatilities -0.005 -0.005 0.003 
Concave Price Volatilities -0.003 -0.005 0.003 
 
     Table 16 presents the corresponding summary of the simulated prices under CBO 
scenario assuming that the price volatilities are fixed at the 2014 level of the storage model. 
Even though I am targeting the same magnitude of expected prices according to the storage 
model, the resulted expected prices using CBO method will still be slightly different from 
that in the storage model due to pseudorandom number generator in Matlab. Since I am also 
interested in isolating the impacts of serial correlation from increasing and concave price 
volatilities, another set of prices are simulated for CBO scenario by imposing the same 
magnitude of price volatilities as that under the storage model. The simulated prices will be 
applied to PLC only. The statistics are provided in Table 17. As shown in Table 18, there is 
almost zero serial dependence among simulated prices using Babcock and Paulson’s method. 
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Results and Discussions 
     For both the storage model and CBO scenario, 5000 five-year yield series are generated 
from the empirical distributions of national yields for each crop. The county-level yields over 
the same period are collected and detrended to 2014 equivalents: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2014𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  , t = 1961, … ,2013, j = 1, 2, 3. (48) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2014𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the trend yield of county i in 2014. County yields from the same years as 
the drawn national yields are drawn not only to maintain the national and county yield 
correlations, and to preserve the spatial correlation among crops and counties, but also to be 
able to estimate price-yield correlations at the county level in a natural way. Specifically, if 
the first five-year sequence of national yields are selected from (1961, 2009, 2000,1988, 
2009), then the same five year yields are picked for each county in the same order. As a result, 
5000 five-year yield samples are created for each county. Moreover, the historical correlation 
between national-level yields and prices are preserved by matching every row (year) of 
county yield with the corresponding row of harvest price draws.  
     For ARC-county, two different ways of constructing price guarantees are investigated. 
One is to build a draw-specific price guarantee and therefore 5000 different price guarantees 
are created for 2015. Similarly, I would have 5000 price guarantees the remaining three years. 
As a result, the price guarantee is not only annually adjusted but also draw-specific. The other 
is to have one common price guarantee for the 5000 price draws by calculating the Olympic 
average of the historical and averaged simulated prices. For example, the Olympic average of 
2010-2013 historical prices and averaged simulated price in 2014 would produce one 
common price guarantee for 2015.  
     Table 19 displays the expected payments per base acre for county-based ARC by crop 
and scenario assuming the same price guarantee is shared among the 5000 draws for a given 
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crop year. For a corn farmer, if he chose to enroll in ARC-county, he would expect to receive 
$57.18/base acre in 2014 but much less payments in the remaining four years, which is 
mainly due to the drop in price guarantees year over year. Because ARC uses a five-year 
Olympic average of prices and yields, historical price data over 2009-2013 (listed in Table 20) 
is assembled to build 2014 price guarantees. The price guarantees for 2015 are constructed by 
historical price data over 2010-2013 and 5000 simulated prices for 2014.  
Table 19. Expected county-based ARC payments with common price guarantee 
for a given crop year 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Storage Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
2014 57.18 55.59 13.69 15.29 16.63 16.46 
2015 53.43 53.94 18.44 17.92 16.71 16.51 
2016 40.64 40.08 19.33 17.34 16.21 16.07 
2017 23.00 18.93 17.25 13.92 13.31 12.67 
2018 21.59 15.89 15.90 11.58 10.72 9.21 
Note: All units are $/base acre. The payment for each year and crop is based on 5000 simulated prices and fixed 
price guarantees. 
 
Table 20. Historical and projected crop prices 
Year Corn Soybeans Wheat 
2009 3.70 9.59 5.50 
2010 5.18 11.30 5.70 
2011 6.22 12.50 7.24 
2012 6.89 14.40 7.77 
2013 4.50 12.30 6.80 
2014 3.60 10.86 4.78 
2015 3.63 10.51 4.86 
2016 3.63 10.42 4.88 
2017 3.64 10.45 4.89 
2018 3.62 10.39 4.89 
Note: All units are $/bu.  Prices for 2014-2018 are projected by the storage model, simply averaging over 5000 simulated 
prices for the corresponding year. 
      
     Table 20 lists the historical crop prices over 2009-2013 and projected prices over 
2014-2018. For corn and wheat, the simulated prices on average are much lower than their 
historical levels. Consequently, the price guarantees would decrease over time, which would 
therefore induce smaller payments year over year. 
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 As shown in Table 19, if the price guarantee is not draw specific, then payments under 
storage model are substantially higher than using the CBO method. In other words, ignoring 
serial dependence and keeping price volatility constant would underestimate the payments for 
ARC-county. However, as displayed in Table 21, there is no obvious difference in expected 
payments between prices generated by the storage model and prices generated using the CBO 
method. Because positive cost effects from serial dependence and increasing price volatility 
are offset by more volatile price guarantees. Given a negative demand shock or a positive 
supply shock in 2016, the market price would be low in 2016. Due to the price serial 
correlations, the market price in 2017 would be low as well, If the price guarantee is draw 
specific, then the lower market price would result in a relatively lower price guarantee and 
therefore a smaller amount of payments, but if a constant price guarantee is used as in PLC, 
then the payments will be high in 2017. 
Table 21. Expected county-based ARC payments by crop and scenario with 
draw-specific price guarantees 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Storage Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario 
2014 57.18 55.59 13.69 15.29 16.63 16.46 
2015 54.11 54.70 19.16 19.52 16.84 16.77 
2016 44.42 45.80 18.91 20.07 16.69 16.79 
2017 26.35 27.18 15.25 17.82 14.14 13.86 
2018 24.67 24.31 11.35 14.48 11.56 10.62 
Note: All units are $/base acre. The payment for each year and crop is based on 5000 simulated prices and 5000 price 
guarantees. 
 
     Similarly as for county-based ARC, two different sets of price guarantees are 
constructed for SCO. The per acre SCO payments that are calculated using a constant price 
guarantee for a given crop year are listed in Table 22 for corn, Table 23 for soybeans and 
Table 24 for wheat. As expected, for each crop, no matter which coverage level farmers 
choose, they would receive more payments if they have Revenue Protection instead of 
Revenue Protection with harvest price exclusion in place to insure their crop revenue.  
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 Furthermore, as the coverage level for the underlying crop insurance product increases, 
payments under both RP and RP-HPE decline. Because SCO program only covers losses that 
fall between the coverage level of the underlying policy and 86% of expected revenue. A full 
amount of SCO coverage is paid when the county average revenue falls to the coverage level 
of the underlying policy. Corn farmers would receive $22.52 per planted acre if they choose 
70% coverage of Revenue Protection in 2014, while they receive only $2.59 per planted acre 
if insured under 85% coverage for the same crop year.  
 In addition, given a certain coverage level, payments would grow significantly over 
time under the storage model while the payments using CBO method are stationary across 
years. Compared to 2014 crop year, the per acre payments are expected to increase at least 27% 
for RP and 31% for RP-HPE in 2018. To sum up, ignoring both intermporal price correlations 
and increasing price volatilities would lead to an underestimate of  the costs for SCO if a 
same price guarantee is adopted for a given crop year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Table 22. Expected SCO payments for corn by policy and scenario with common price 
guarantee for a given crop year 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:     
2014 22.52 18.07 11.67 2.59 
2015 28.16 22.03 13.80 2.93 
2016 31.40 24.14 14.86 3.09 
2017 34.22 26.05 15.88 3.24 
2018 35.48 26.79 16.18 3.28 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 23.00 18.48 11.92 2.63 
2015 23.82 19.11 12.31 2.70 
2016 23.21 18.64 12.02 2.65 
2017 24.19 19.40 12.47 2.72 
2018 23.46 18.80 12.09 2.66 
RP-HPE 
Storage Model:     
2014 16.47 13.35 8.70 2.02 
2015 21.88 17.12 10.70 2.33 
2016 24.84 19.02 11.63 2.46 
2017 27.46 20.75 12.51 2.60 
2018 28.78 21.55 12.86 2.64 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 18.11 14.63 9.45 2.15 
2015 18.80 15.14 9.76 2.20 
2016 18.15 14.66 9.47 2.15 
2017 18.92 15.25 9.82 2.22 
2018 18.42 14.82 9.54 2.16 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
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Table 23. Expected SCO payments for soybeans by policy and scenario with 
common price guarantee for a given crop year 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:         
2014 17.13 14.00 9.17 2.13 
2015 20.33 16.16 10.28 2.29 
2016 22.68 17.69 11.04 2.40 
2017 24.94 19.24 11.86 2.53 
2018 25.81 19.71 12.04 2.55 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 17.68 14.31 9.28 2.12 
2015 17.28 13.99 9.06 2.08 
2016 16.62 13.51 8.80 2.04 
2017 17.52 14.16 9.17 2.10 
2018 16.71 13.55 8.81 2.03 
RPHPE 
Storage Model:         
2014 12.74 10.48 6.93 1.69 
2015 16.05 12.72 8.08 1.85 
2016 18.29 14.16 8.78 1.95 
2017 20.39 15.57 9.51 2.06 
2018 21.35 16.11 9.72 2.09 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 14.52 11.76 7.64 1.80 
2015 14.23 11.53 7.48 1.77 
2016 13.62 11.10 7.25 1.73 
2017 14.37 11.63 7.54 1.78 
2018 13.74 11.16 7.26 1.73 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
 
Table 24. Expected SCO payments for wheat by policy and scenario with common price 
guarantee for a given crop year 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:     
2014 9.57 7.66 4.97 1.28 
2015 11.77 9.24 5.85 1.42 
2016 12.86 9.98 6.24 1.48 
2017 13.80 10.61 6.57 1.53 
2018 14.41 10.99 6.76 1.56 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
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Table 24 continued 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 9.72 7.74 5.00 1.27 
2015 9.78 7.79 5.03 1.28 
2016 9.84 7.84 5.05 1.28 
2017 9.83 7.84 5.06 1.29 
2018 9.84 7.84 5.07 1.29 
RPHPE 
Storage Model:     
2014 7.43 5.97 3.89 1.07 
2015 9.36 7.34 4.64 1.19 
2016 10.37 8.01 4.99 1.24 
2017 11.17 8.52 5.24 1.28 
2018 11.74 8.87 5.40 1.30 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 8.09 6.43 4.15 1.11 
2015 8.14 6.48 4.18 1.12 
2016 8.20 6.51 4.19 1.12 
2017 8.18 6.51 4.20 1.12 
2018 8.18 6.51 4.20 1.12 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
      
     Table 25 gives the per acre SCO payments for corn farmers if price guarantee is draw 
specific, and the corresponding results for soybeans and wheat farmers are listed in Table 26 
and Table 27. These sets of results are how program costs should be calculated because the 
guarantee reflects market conditions, which is how the programs are supposed to work. For 
each year’s simulation under the storage model, I am able to obtain 5000 actual price 
realizations and 5000 expected price realizations using the storer’s non-arbitrage conditions. 
The 5000 price guarantees in 2015 are simulated in 2014 and so on. Since 2014 is the year 
that started the simulation, no corresponding expected prices could be simulated, so I am still 
using a constant  averaged price as the price guarantee.  
     Similarly as ARC-county, for all three crops, payments with draw-specific price 
guarantee tend to be stable across years due to the offsetting effects from more volatile price 
guarantees. However, the payments under the storage model with draw-specifice price 
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guarantees would be much lower than that under CBO scenario. One possible explanation is 
that the storage model can rationally and more accurately adjust its expectation on prices 
given any market environment. 
Table 25. Expected SCO payments for corn by policy and scenario with draw-specific 
price guarantees 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:         
2014 22.52 18.07 11.67 2.59 
2015 16.42 13.35 8.89 2.11 
2016 15.88 12.89 8.58 2.06 
2017 16.24 13.16 8.76 2.08 
2018 15.77 12.80 8.54 2.05 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 23.00 18.48 11.92 2.63 
2015 23.82 19.11 12.31 2.70 
2016 23.21 18.64 12.02 2.65 
2017 24.19 19.40 12.47 2.72 
2018 23.46 18.80 12.09 2.66 
RPHPE 
Storage Model:         
2014 16.47 13.35 8.70 2.02 
2015 10.49 8.75 6.01 1.57 
2016 10.01 8.34 5.75 1.52 
2017 10.21 8.49 5.85 1.53 
2018 10.04 8.36 5.77 1.52 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 18.11 14.63 9.45 2.15 
2015 18.80 15.14 9.76 2.20 
2016 18.15 14.66 9.47 2.15 
2017 18.92 15.25 9.82 2.22 
2018 18.42 14.82 9.54 2.16 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
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Table 26. Expected SCO payments for soybeans by policy and scenario with 
draw-specific price guarantees 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:         
2014 17.13 14.00 9.17 2.13 
2015 12.71 10.57 7.16 1.79 
2016 11.96 9.95 6.75 1.71 
2017 11.94 9.91 6.71 1.69 
2018 11.62 9.66 6.56 1.67 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 17.68 14.31 9.28 2.12 
2015 17.28 13.99 9.06 2.08 
2016 16.62 13.51 8.80 2.04 
2017 17.52 14.16 9.17 2.10 
2018 16.71 13.55 8.81 2.03 
RPHPE 
Storage Model:         
2014 12.74 10.48 6.93 1.69 
2015 9.24 7.81 5.42 1.45 
2016 8.50 7.20 5.02 1.38 
2017 8.39 7.09 4.93 1.35 
2018 8.31 7.02 4.90 1.35 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 14.52 11.76 7.64 1.80 
2015 14.23 11.53 7.48 1.77 
2016 13.62 11.10 7.25 1.73 
2017 14.37 11.63 7.54 1.78 
2018 13.74 11.16 7.26 1.73 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices.. 
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Table 27. Expected SCO payments for wheat by policy and scenario with draw-specific 
price guarantees 
  Coverage Level 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 
RP 
Storage Model:         
2014 9.57 7.66 4.97 1.28 
2015 8.21 6.63 4.38 1.18 
2016 8.14 6.57 4.35 1.17 
2017 8.12 6.56 4.33 1.16 
2018 8.06 6.51 4.31 1.16 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 9.72 7.74 5.00 1.27 
2015 9.78 7.79 5.03 1.28 
2016 9.84 7.84 5.05 1.28 
2017 9.83 7.84 5.06 1.29 
2018 9.84 7.84 5.07 1.29 
RPHPE 
Storage Model:         
2014 7.43 5.97 3.89 1.07 
2015 6.09 4.95 3.31 0.97 
2016 6.07 4.93 3.28 0.96 
2017 6.04 4.91 3.27 0.96 
2018 6.00 4.87 3.25 0.96 
CBO Scenario: 
    2014 8.09 6.43 4.15 1.11 
2015 8.14 6.48 4.18 1.12 
2016 8.20 6.51 4.19 1.12 
2017 8.18 6.51 4.20 1.12 
2018 8.18 6.51 4.20 1.12 
Note: All units are $/planted acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices. 
     
Table 28. Expected PLC payments by crop and scenario 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Storage Model 
CBO 
Scenario I 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario I 
Storage 
Model 
CBO 
Scenario I 
2014 48.95 48.45 2.66 3.32 33.13 33.39 
2015 55.40 47.59 8.30 4.59 34.58 31.10 
2016 61.70 46.45 13.03 4.41 35.59 30.83 
2017 65.30 48.17 16.24 4.58 36.62 30.62 
2018 69.19 48.56 19.40 5.05 37.38 29.74 
Note: All units are $/base acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices. In addition, the price 
volatilities for CBO scenario are fixed at the 2014 levels projected by the storage model. 
     
     Table 28 displays the expected payments per base acre for PLC. The payments under 
CBO Scenario I are based on the assumption that the price volatilities are constant over the 
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five-year simulation for each crop and fixed at 2014 levels projected by the storage model. 
Corn farmers would receive most payments under PLC beacuse the simulated prices for corn 
is further below its reference price ($3.70/bushel) than the other two crops. Furthermore, PLC 
payments under the storage model increase dramatically over periods while they stay steady 
if using CBO method. The most notable increase is observed in soybeans. Soybeans farmers 
would receive a payment of $19.4 per acre in 2018 which is only $2.66 per acre in 2014. 
Alike as ARC and SCO, the payments would be underestimated if serial correlation and 
increasing price volatility are ignored.  
     As is mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, another set of CBO prices are 
simulated by incorporating the same magnitude of price volatilities as that under the storage 
model. The simulated prices are then applied to PLC to isolate the impacts on cost estimatons 
of serial correlations. The results are listed in Table 29. After imposing the increasing price 
volatilities, a similar pattern of the payments as that under the storage model is found for 
CBO secenario, that is the payments grow significantly over time, which indicates that 
increasing price volatility accounts for the most part of the increase in program costs. The 
mild differences in the payments between the storage model and CBO scenario are attributed 
to the fact that the expected prices and volatities using CBO method are slightly different 
from that under the storage model (refer to Table 15 and Table 17). Instead of using a 
complicated storage model, CBO could inflate the price volatilities over periods and come up 
with a more accurate program cost estimations. 
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Table 29. Expected PLC payments by crop and scenario 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Year Storage Model 
CBO Scenario 
II 
Storage 
Model 
CBO Scenario 
II 
Storage 
Model 
CBO Scenario 
II 
2014 48.95 48.45 2.66 3.32 33.13 33.39 
2015 55.40 55.97 8.30 7.97 34.58 34.83 
2016 61.70 61.49 13.03 11.24 35.59 36.59 
2017 65.30 69.05 16.24 14.82 36.62 38.48 
2018 69.19 73.77 19.40 18.22 37.38 38.58 
Note: All units are $/base acre. The payment for each crop and year is based on 5000 simulated prices. In addition, the price 
volatilities are also increasing and concave for CBO scenario. 
 
 
Conclusions 
     Program payments for PLC are underestimated if both price serial correlations and 
increasing price volatilities are ignored. Furthermore, the impacts from serial correlations are 
isolated by a further test on PLC. After imposing the same level of price volatility as 
generated by the storage model but maintaining the assumption of no serial correlation, there 
is no apparent differences in program costs between the storage model and CBO method. In 
other words, the increase in estimated PLC payments can be attributed to differences in price 
volatilities, rather than serial correlation. Instead of using the complicated storage model, 
CBO could simply inflate the price volatilities by a reasonable range to obtain more accurate 
estimations of PLC payments.  
     For ARC-county, the payments under the storage model and CBO scenario are similar 
when program guarantees are adjusted to reflect market conditions in the simulated draws. 
Even though unconditional price volatilities increase over time, program costs do not because 
conditional price volatilities (conditional on market conditions) do not increase over time. For 
example, given a positive yield shock in 2015, the increase in the supply would drive down 
the market price. As prices are serially correlated, the market price for 2016 would be lower 
as well. So if a constant price guarantee is used, farmers may get a positive payment due to 
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lower market price, however, if the price guarantee is adjusted to be draw-specific, then the 
payments would decrease due to lower price guarantee. 
     Unlike ARC-county, the payments for SCO are lower under the storage model than 
under the CBO method when allowing draw-specific price guarantees. Besides the 
compensation effect of serial dependence, another reason that may explain the different 
pattern observed in ARC-county and SCO is the way of constructing their price guarantees. 
ARC-county use the Olympic average of prices in last five years. So it constructs its 2014 
price guarantee totally based on historical 2009-2013 prices and gradually takes in the prices 
simulated from the storage model to build the guarantees for the remaing four years. Even for 
2018, the historical prices of 2013 are used to calculate the price guarantees. But for SCO, the 
price guarantee has only one period dependence. The storage model would give lower 
payments because of its internal structure, which enables it to make rational and accurate 
expections on prices.  
81 
 
REFERENCES 
Adjemian, Michael K., and Aaron Smith. "Using USDA forecasts to estimate the price 
flexibility of demand for agricultural commodities." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 94.4 (2012): 978-995. 
 
Babcock, B.A. and Paulson, N.D. (2012), “Potential Impact of Proposed 2012 Farm Bill 
Commodity Programs on Developing Countries”, ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade 
and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
Geneva, October. 
 
Binfield, Julian, et al. "A stochastic analysis of proposals for the new US farm 
bill." Zaragoza (Spain) 28 (2002): 31. 
 
Cafiero, Carlo, et al. "The empirical relevance of the competitive storage model."Journal of 
Econometrics 162.1 (2011): 44-54. 
 
Coble, Keith H., Erik O’Donoghue, and J. Corey Miller. "The Effects of the Agricultural Act 
of 2014 on the Optimal Choice of Farm-level Insurance Coverage Levels." 
 
Daniel A. Sumner, Vincent H. Smith and Barry K. Goodwin. “American Boondoggle: Fixing 
the 2012 Farm Bill,” Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, July 12, 2011. 
 
Deaton, Angus, and Guy Laroque. "On the behaviour of commodity prices." The Review of 
Economic Studies 59.1 (1992): 1-23. 
 
Deaton, Angus, and Guy Laroque. "Estimating a nonlinear rational expectations commodity 
price model with unobservable state variables." Journal of Applied Econometrics 10.S1 
(1995): S9-S40. 
 
Deaton, A., & Laroque, G. (1996) Competitive storage and commodity price dynamics. 
Journal of Political Economy, 896-923. 
 
FAPRI-UMC Report #12-04. “Documentation of the FAPRI Modeling Systerm.” 
http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/publications/ 
 
FAPRI-MU Report #09-11. “FAPRI-MU Stochastic U.S. Crop Model Documentation.” 
http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/publications/ 
 
FAPRI-MU Report #02-15. “U.S. crop program fiscal costs: Revised estimates with updated 
participation information.” http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/publications/ 
 
Goodwin, Barry K., and Alan P. Ker. "Nonparametric estimation of crop yield distributions: 
implications for rating group-risk crop insurance contracts."American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 80.1 (1998): 139-153. 
 
Iman, Ronald L., and W. J. Conover. "A distribution-free approach to inducing rank 
correlation among input variables."Communications in Statistics-Simulation and 
Computation 11.3 (1982): 311-334. 
 
82 
 
Jin, Na, et al. "The long-term structure of commodity futures." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 94.3 (2012): 718-735. 
 
Judd, Kenneth L., Lilia Maliar, and Serguei Maliar. "Numerically stable and accurate 
stochastic simulation approaches for solving dynamic economic models." Quantitative 
Economics 2.2 (2011): 173-210. 
 
Judd, Kenneth L. Numerical methods in economics. MIT press, 1998. 
 
Kaldor, Nicholas. "Speculation and economic stability." The Review of Economic Studies 7.1 
(1939): 1-27. 
 
Ker, A.P., and K. Coble. 2003. “Modeling Conditional Yield Densities.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 85: 291-304. 
 
Lence, Sergio, Chad Hart, and Dermot Hayes. "An econometric analysis of the structure of 
commodity futures prices." Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the Agricultural and 
Applied Economics Association, Milwaukee WI. 2009. 
 
Lence, S. H., and D. J. Hayes. "U.S. Farm Policy and the Volatility of Commodity Prices and 
Farm Revenues." American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 84. No. 
2(2002):335-351. 
 
Mason, Chuck, Dermot J. Hayes, and Sergio H. Lence. "Systemic risk in US crop reinsurance 
programs."Agricultural Finance Review 63.1 (2003): 23-39. 
 
Miranda, M.J. and Fackler, P.L. (2002): Applied Computational Economics and Finance, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Miranda, M., and P. Fackler. Computational Methods in Economics-MATLAB Toolbox. File 
downloadable from the website http://www4.ncsu.edu/~pfackler/ECG790C/. 
 
Miranda, Mario J., and Peter G. Helmberger. "The effects of commodity price stabilization 
programs." The American Economic Review (1988): 46-58. 
 
Miranda, Mario J. "Numerical strategies for solving the nonlinear rational expectations 
commodity market model." Computational Economics 11.1-2 (1997): 71-87. 
 
Miranda, Mario J., and Joseph W. Glauber. "Systemic risk, reinsurance, and the failure of 
crop insurance markets."American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79.1 (1997): 206-215. 
 
Muth, John F. "Rational expectations and the theory of price movements."Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society (1961): 315-335. 
 
Paul, Allen B. "The pricing of binspace—a contribution to the theory of storage."American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 52.1 (1970): 1-12. 
 
Paulson, Nicholas D, Woodard, Joshua D. and Babcock, Bruce A.. "Modelling "shallow 
Loss" Crop Revenue Programs: Issues and Implications for the 2013 Farm Bill." Agricultural 
Finance Review. 2013. 
83 
 
 
Paulson, Nicholas D., and Bruce A. Babcock. "Get a GRIP: Should Area Revenue Coverage 
Be Offered through the Farm Bill or as a Crop Insurance Program?."Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics (2008): 137-153. 
 
Peterson, Hikaru Hanawa, and William G. Tomek. "How much of commodity price behavior 
can a rational expectations storage model explain?." Agricultural Economics 33.3 (2005): 
289-303. 
 
Piggott, Nicholas E., and Michael K. Wohlgenant. "Price elasticities, joint products, and 
international trade." Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 46.4 (2002): 
487-500. 
 
Reimer, Jeffrey J., Xiaojuan Zheng, and Mark J. Gehlhar. "Export demand elasticity 
estimation for major US crops." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 44.04 (2012): 
501-515. 
 
Roberts, Michael J., and A. Nam Tran. "Commodity Price Adjustment in a Competitive 
Storage Model with an Application to the US Biofuel Policies." 2012 Annual Meeting, August 
12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington. No. 124869. Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Association, 2012. 
 
Roberts, Michael J., and Wolfram Schlenker. 2013. "Identifying Supply and Demand 
Elasticities of Agricultural Commodities: Implications for the US Ethanol 
Mandate." American Economic Review, 103(6): 2265-95. 
 
Rui, Xiongwen, and Mario J. Miranda. "Commodity storage and interseasonal price 
dynamics." NCR-134 Conference Proceedings. 1995. 
Sumner, Daniel A., Vincent H. Smith, and Barry K. Goodwin.American Boondoggle: Fixing 
the 2012 Farm Bill. No. 32548. 2011. 
 
Vedenov, Dmitry V., et al. "Economic analysis of the standard reinsurance 
agreement."Agricultural Finance Review 64.2 (2004): 119-134. 
 
Williams, Jeffrey C., and Brian D. Wright. Storage and commodity markets. Cambridge 
university press, 2005. 
 
William G. Tomek. "Commodity Futures Prices as Forecasts." Review of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring - Summer, 1997), pp. 23-44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
APPENDIX MATLAB CODE USED TO SOLVE STORAGE MODEL 
clc 
clear all 
tic 
global mu_2014 std_2014 y_emp betaacre alphaacre acreplanted alphacon acretotal elasd 
fspace n alpha_cy beta_cy r m sigma1 eta_cur acre_por; 
  
% all the parameters 
n1=8; 
n=n1^3; 
n3=5000; 
n4=5; 
r=0.0526; 
m=0.36; 
% the range of total amount available for three crops 
tacmax=20; 
tacmin=10; 
tasmax=7; 
tasmin=2.6; 
tawmax=4; 
tawmin=2.5; 
% acre planted in 2014 
acreplanted=[0.0906;0.0833;0.0568]; 
acretotal=sum(acreplanted); 
acre_por=0.98; 
betaacre=[0.2 -0.08 -0.08;-0.08 0.2 -0.08; -0.08 -0.08 0.2]; 
sigma1=[0.15,0.14,0.13]; 
elasd=[-0.56;-0.45;-0.15]; 
  
% demand shock  
eta_cur=1; 
eta_t=zeros(n3,3,n4+1); 
for i=1:(n4+1) 
    for j=1:3 
        rng('default') 
        eta_t(:,j,i)=normrnd(eta_cur,sqrt(i)*sigma1(j),n3,1);    
    end 
end 
  
% demand function calibrated using 2013/2014 data 
pricecurrent=[4.46;13;6.87]; 
consum=[13.454;3.478;2.436]; 
alphacon=pricecurrent./(eta_cur*consum.^(1./elasd)); 
  
cornyield = dataset('XLSFile','corn-national yield.xlsx'); 
nyield=length(cornyield.year); 
X=[ones(nyield,1),cornyield.year]; 
  
% log-linear trending 
85 
 
[b1,bint1,r1] = regress(log(cornyield.yield),X); 
  
% detrended yield 
cornyield.trend1=exp(X*b1); 
alpha_corn=regress(cornyield.yield,cornyield.trend1); 
cornyield.trend=alpha_corn*cornyield.trend1; 
cornyield_2014=exp([1, 2014]*b1)*alpha_corn; 
cornyield.detrend=cornyield.yield*cornyield_2014./cornyield.trend; 
  
% soybeans yield 
soybeansyield = dataset('XLSFile','soybeans-national yield.xlsx'); 
  
% log-linear trending 
[b2,bint2,r2] = regress(log(soybeansyield.yield),X); 
  
% detrended yield 
soybeansyield.trend1=exp(X*b2); 
alpha_soy=regress(soybeansyield.yield,soybeansyield.trend1); 
soybeansyield.trend=alpha_soy*soybeansyield.trend1; 
soybeansyield_2014=exp([1, 2014]*b2)*alpha_soy; 
soybeansyield.detrend=soybeansyield.yield*soybeansyield_2014./soybeansyield.trend; 
  
% wheat yield 
wheatyield = dataset('XLSFile','wheat-national yield.xlsx'); 
[b3,bint3,r3] = regress(log(wheatyield.yield),X); 
wheatyield.trend1=exp(X*b3); 
alpha_wheat=regress(wheatyield.yield,wheatyield.trend1); 
wheatyield.trend=alpha_wheat*wheatyield.trend1; 
wheattrend_2014=exp([1,2014]*b3)*alpha_wheat; 
wheatyield.detrend=wheatyield.yield*wheattrend_2014./wheatyield.trend; 
  
mu_2014=[mean(cornyield.detrend),mean(soybeansyield.detrend),mean(wheatyield.detrend)]
; 
std_2014=[std(cornyield.detrend),std(soybeansyield.detrend),std(wheatyield.detrend)]; 
  
% using empirical yield data 
y_emp=[cornyield.detrend, soybeansyield.detrend, wheatyield.detrend]; 
  
% approximate acreage supply function as a function of expected revenue 
options1=optimset('Display','iter','MaxIter',5000, 'TolFun',1e-10,'TolX',1e-10); 
[alphaacre,alphaacrefval]=fsolve(@(x) acre(x),[10;10;10], options1); 
  
% Marginal conveience yield 
% using 2002/03 and 2012/13 data to calibrate marginal conveience yield functions 
% assume alpha*exp(-beta*I) 
[c_cy,fvalc_cy]=fsolve(@(x) cyc(x),[10,10], options1); 
% for soybeans and wheat(using output-averaged price data) 
[s_cy,fvals_cy]=fsolve(@(x) cys(x),[10,10], options1); 
[w_cy,fvalw_cy]=fsolve(@(x) cyw(x),[10,10], options1); 
alpha_cy=[c_cy(1);s_cy(1);w_cy(1)]; 
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beta_cy=[c_cy(2);s_cy(2);w_cy(2)]; 
  
fspace=fundefn('cheb', [n1 n1 n1], [tacmin, tasmin, tawmin], [tacmax, tasmax, tawmax]); 
ta=funnode(fspace); 
B=funbas(fspace,ta); 
% B is equivalent to kron(kron(B3,B2),B1) 
fspace1=fundefn('cheb', n1, tacmin, tacmax); 
fspace2=fundefn('cheb', n1, tasmin, tasmax); 
fspace3=fundefn('cheb', n1, tawmin, tawmax); 
ta1=funnode(fspace1); 
ta2=funnode(fspace2); 
ta3=funnode(fspace3); 
B1=funbas(fspace1,ta1); 
B2=funbas(fspace2,ta2); 
B3=funbas(fspace3,ta3); 
  
TA1=kron(ones(n1^2,1),ta1); 
TA2=repmat(kron(ta2,ones(n1,1)),n1,1); 
TA3=kron(ta3,ones(n1^2,1)); 
TA=[TA1,TA2,TA3]; 
  
st=zeros(n,6); 
c0=ones(n,3); 
c1=zeros(n,3); 
options=optimset('Display','off','MaxFunEvals',1000, 'TolFun',1e-6,'TolX',1e-6); 
x0=[0.8, 0.07, 0.4, 0.09,0.08,0.05]; 
while max(max(abs(c0-c1)))>1e-6 
    c0=c1; 
    for i=1:n 
    [st(i,:),fval(i,:)]=fsolve(@(x) storage(x,TA(i,:)',c0),x0, options); 
  
    end 
    c1=inv(B)*st(:,1:3); 
    max(max(abs(c0-c1))) 
end 
toc 
 
function L=acre(x) 
global mu_2014 std_2014 acreplanted betaacre acre_por 
pnext=[4.568, 11.606, 7.191]; 
volat3=[0.19, 0.13, 0.18]; 
pricestd=volat3.*pnext; 
% py_cor=[-0.59, -0.42, -0.3125]; 
load('wheat own price_yield correlation.mat','py_cor') 
% calculate covariance 
py_cov=pricestd.*std_2014.*py_cor; 
% calculate the expected revenue for corn, soybens, and wheat 
exprev3=pnext.*mu_2014+py_cov; 
L=log(x)+betaacre*log(exprev3')+log(acre_por)-log(acreplanted); 
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function L=cyc(theta) 
global r m 
L=[theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*1.087)+2.385/(1+r)-m-2.32;theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*0.821)+5.678/(
1+r)-m-6.89]; 
 
function L=cys(theta) 
global r m 
L=[theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*0.178)+5.291/(1+r)-m-5.53;theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*0.141)+12.852/
(1+r)-m-14.4]; 
 
function L=cyw(theta) 
global r m 
L=[theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*0.491)+3.473/(1+r)-m-3.56;theta(1)*exp(-theta(2)*0.718)+8.372/(
1+r)-m-7.77]; 
 
% three-crop storage model 
function L=storage(theta,xx,c0) 
% theta 1*6 vector, xx 3*1 vector 
global y_emp betaacre alphaacre alphacon acretotal elasd fspace n alpha_cy beta_cy r m 
sigma1 eta_cur; 
nn1=10; 
  
[etanext1,wetanext1] = qnwnorm(nn1,eta_cur,sigma1(1)^2); 
[etanext2,wetanext2] = qnwnorm(nn1,eta_cur,sigma1(2)^2); 
[etanext3,wetanext3] = qnwnorm(nn1,eta_cur,sigma1(3)^2); 
wetanext=[wetanext1,wetanext2,wetanext3]; 
% equation for expected price of corn 
tanext=zeros(size(y_emp,1),3); 
for j1=1:3 
    tanext(:,j1)=theta(1,j1)+theta(1,j1+3)*y_emp(:,j1); 
end 
Bnext=zeros(size(y_emp,1),n); 
for j2=1:size(y_emp,1) 
    Bnext(j2,:)=funbas(fspace,tanext(j2,:)); 
end 
  
f_etanext=zeros(length(etanext1),3); 
for j3=1:length(etanext1) 
    
f_etanext(j3,1)=mean((tanext(:,1)-Bnext*c0(:,1)).^(1/elasd(1))*alphacon(1)*etanext1(j3)); 
    
f_etanext(j3,2)=mean((tanext(:,2)-Bnext*c0(:,2)).^(1/elasd(2))*alphacon(2)*etanext2(j3)); 
    
f_etanext(j3,3)=mean((tanext(:,3)-Bnext*c0(:,3)).^(1/elasd(3))*alphacon(3)*etanext3(j3)); 
end 
EP=zeros(3,1); 
for i=1:3 
    EP(i)=f_etanext(:,i)'*wetanext(:,i); 
end 
88 
 
  
g_etanext=zeros(length(etanext1),3); 
for j4=1:length(etanext1) 
    
g_etanext(j4,1)=mean(((tanext(:,1)-Bnext*c0(:,1)).^(1/elasd(1))*alphacon(1)*etanext1(j4)).*
y_emp(:,1)); 
    
g_etanext(j4,2)=mean(((tanext(:,2)-Bnext*c0(:,2)).^(1/elasd(2))*alphacon(2)*etanext2(j4)).*
y_emp(:,2)); 
    
g_etanext(j4,3)=mean(((tanext(:,3)-Bnext*c0(:,3)).^(1/elasd(3))*alphacon(3)*etanext3(j4)).*
y_emp(:,3));   
end 
Exrev=zeros(3,1); 
for i=1:3 
    Exrev(i)=g_etanext(:,i)'*wetanext(:,i); 
end 
L=[(1/(1+r))*EP-(xx-theta(1,1:3)').^(1./elasd).*alphacon-m*ones(3,1)+alpha_cy.*exp(-beta_
cy.*theta(1,1:3)');... 
 
log(alphaacre)+betaacre*log(Exrev)-log(alphaacre'*prod((ones(3,1)*Exrev').^betaacre,2))+lo
g(acretotal)-log(theta(1,4:6)')];  
  
end 
 
 
 
 
